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One of the most famous Supreme Court tax cases celebrated its eightieth 
birthday last year. In Poe v. Seaborn, the Court reified two principles of the federal 
income tax: ownership determines tax liability and state law determines ownership. 
This Article affirms that family taxation continues to follow ownership, not 
marriage, despite the federal government’s position that the “ownership equals 
taxability” rule applies almost exclusively to heterosexual spouses. Verifying the 
vitality of this principle carries significant implications for all families, particularly 
nontraditional families. Under the aegis of Seaborn, the principle authorizes 
certain members of state-recognized relationships—marriages, domestic 
partnerships, civil unions—to file federal income taxes based on ownership 
interests under state law and to split combined income in half, an outcome largely 
at odds with current treatment. Indeed, Seaborn provides legally recognized same-
sex couples a way around the tax filing restrictions and disadvantages imposed on 
them by the Defense of Marriage Act, which does not consider them spouses under 
federal law. Seaborn empowers these families to take advantage of tax savings 
associated with income splitting. 
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To prove that ownership of income and property, rather than marriage, 
determines family tax liability, this Article traces the “ownership equals taxability” 
principle from the late nineteenth century to after World War II; that is, from the 
decades leading up to ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment to the Supreme 
Court’s landmark decision in Seaborn and beyond. It is a story of the early federal 
income tax, of tax avoidance opportunities for families, of the nature of spouses’ 
legal interests as defined by state property law, and of early tax enforcement efforts 
by the Treasury Department and Congress. It is also a story of how the Supreme 
Court protected Congress’s taxing power and the federal purse by articulating an 
expansive definition of ownership for tax purposes, particularly in the context of 
the family.  
INTRODUCTION 
Late last year, one of the most famous U.S. Supreme Court tax cases celebrated 
its eightieth birthday. In Poe v. Seaborn, the Court reified two principles of the 
federal income tax: ownership determines tax liability1 and state law determines 
ownership.2 For eight decades, federal courts3 and the Internal Revenue  
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. 282 U.S. 101, 109–10 (1930) (holding federal income tax assesses a levy “upon the 
net income of every individual” and that “the word ‘of’ denotes ownership”). 
 2. Id. at 110 (explaining that, in determining ownership of income and property to be 
taxed under the federal income tax, the “answer is found in the statutes of the State”). 
 3. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 197 (1971) (“[F]ederal income tax 
liability follows ownership. In the determination of ownership, state law controls.”); 
Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, 161 (1942) (“When Congress fixes a tax on the possibility 
of . . . the distribution of income, the ‘necessary implication,’ we think, is that the possibility 
is to be determined by the state law.”); Morgan v. Comm’r, 309 U.S. 78, 82 (1940) (“[I]n the 
application of a federal revenue act, state law controls in determining the nature of the legal 
interest which the taxpayer had in the property or income sought to be reached by the 
statute.”); Comm’r v. Dunkin, 500 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding ownership 
determines taxability and state law determines ownership); Raymond v. United States, 355 
F.3d 107, 112 n.8 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[A] married couple could ‘split’ income derived from 
property co-owned by operation of law in a community property state.” (citing Poe v. 
Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930))); United States v. Goodyear, 99 F.2d 523 (9th Cir. 1938) 
(finding that taxability follows ownership, and California property law provides spouses 
equal 50% interest in all marital income and property); Simmons v. Cullen, 197 F. Supp. 
179, 181 (N.D. Cal. 1961) (arguing that “the incidence of the tax follows ownership of the 
income” and ownership “is governed by local rather than Federal law” (citing Poe v. 
Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930))); Mitchell v. Comm’r, 131 T.C. 215, 218 (2008) (stating that 
“tax liability for income from property attaches to the owner of the property” and “[s]tate 
law determines the nature of a property interest”); Dotson v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary 
Opinion 2004-164, at 4–5 (2004) (noting that it is a “well-established principle that income 
from property is taxed to the owner of the property” and asserting that “State law controls in 
deciding . . . property interests”); Witcher v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (CCH) 2002-292, at 6 (2002) 
(finding that “income from property is taxed to the owner of the property”); Westerdahl v. 
Comm’r, 82 T.C. 83 (1984) (stating that federal income tax liability is based on ownership 
under state property law); Bagur v. Comm’r, 66 T.C. 817, 819 (1976) (stating that federal 
income taxation follows ownership and “State law determines the ownership of income” to 
be taxed); Bishop v. Comm’r, 4 T.C. 588, 592 (1945) (referring to the proposition from Poe 
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Service4 have cited Seaborn’s “ownership equals taxability” holding, both with 
respect to family income and other income as well.5 Its application is so extensive 
that every April 15, tens of millions of taxpayers attest to their tax liability by 
applying Seaborn whether they realize it or not.6  
Despite Seaborn’s pervasiveness, the IRS ruled in 2006 that the “ownership 
equals taxability” rule applies exclusively to married couples and, more pointedly, 
to heterosexual married couples.7 In particular, the IRS refused to apply Seaborn to 
registered domestic partners (RDPs) in California, even though that state’s property 
law holds that RDPs “shall have the same rights, protections, and benefits, and 
shall be subject to the same responsibilities, obligations, and duties under law . . . 
as are granted to and imposed upon spouses.”8 The government’s primary argument 
was that case law relating to Seaborn “has always arisen solely in the context of 
spouses”9 and did not attach to other legally recognized relationships. Even though 
domestic partners, like spouses, each owned one half of all community income 
under California property law, unlike spouses, they could not each report one half 
of the community income for purposes of filing federal income taxes. The 
government’s argument was both false and unavailing. Courts had in fact applied 
Seaborn in contexts outside of marriage.10 Equally important, even though Seaborn 
involved the allocation of taxable income and property between two taxpayer 
spouses, nothing in the Court’s decision limited its application to husbands and 
wives.  
In 2010, the IRS revised its position,11 but once more missed the mark. In 
response to a request for guidance from a California taxpayer, the IRS ruled that the 
taxpayer and his domestic partner “must report one-half of the community 
income.”12 In so doing, the government applied Seaborn’s “ownership equals 
taxability” principle to RDPs for the first time. But its reasoning was flawed, as it 
was grounded in a 2006 change to California’s domestic partnership law that had 
                                                                                                                 
v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930), that “ownership is the test of taxability” and finding that 
state property law determines ownership).  
 4. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2002-22, 2002-1 C.B. 849; I.R.S. Notice 96-19, 1996-1 C.B. 
371; Rev. Rul. 87-13, 1987-1 C.B. 20; Rev. Rul. 69-471, 1969-2 C.B. 10; Rev. Rul. 63-168, 
1963-2 C.B. 9; Rev. Rul. 55-597, 1955-2 C.B. 15; see also IRM § 25.18.1.1 (Feb. 15, 2005), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part25/irm_25-018-001.html (“Federal law determines 
how property is taxed, but state law determines whether, and to what extent, a taxpayer has 
‘property’ or ‘rights to property’ subject to taxation.”). 
 5. Mitchell, 403 U.S. at 197. 
 6. For married couples, the administrative convenience of joint filing, 26 U.S.C. 
§ 1(a)(1) (2006), which assumes equal ownership of marital income and property, may 
obscure Seaborn’s salience, but it does not nullify its application. 
 7. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. 200608038 (Feb. 24, 2006). 
 8. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(a) (West 2004). 
 9. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. 200608038, supra note 7, at 3. 
 10. See, e.g., Hogan v. United States, No. 85-0041, 1985 WL 6395 (D. Me. 1985) 
(involving tax treatment of earnings of a Jesuit priest who had taken a vow of poverty); 
Teschner v. Comm’r, 38 T.C. 1003 (1962) (involving allocation of income from contest 
winnings between father and daughter); see also infra Parts V.A.1–2 examining cases 
involving trusts and assignments.  
 11. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. 201021050 (May 5, 2010).  
 12. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).  
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prohibited RDPs from treating earned income as community property for state 
income tax purposes.13 The earlier prohibition never affected the shared, vested, 
and equal ownership interests of RDPs in all community income and property. Nor 
did repealing the prohibition suddenly grant such interests to RDPs under the 
state’s community property law. Each member of a domestic partnership in 
California owned one-half the community’s income and property both before and 
after the 2006 amendment regardless of its characterization on state tax returns. 
State tax law is largely irrelevant for purposes of determining federal income tax 
liability.14  
Instead, as this Article demonstrates, ownership of income and property is the 
lodestar of family taxation under the federal income tax. California community 
property law grants equal ownership to domestic partners and opposite-sex spouses 
in precisely the same way. Similarly, equal ownership attaches to domestic partners 
in the community property states of Nevada and Washington.15 More generally, 
equal ownership can attach to income and property of couples resident in any state 
with legally recognized domestic relationships so long as the state provides distinct 
ownership interests within those relationships by operation of general property 
law.16 Seaborn treats all these couples equally, allocating federal tax liability within 
the family by ownership interest under state property law. If the interests are equal, 
Seaborn further authorizes the couple to split combined income in half when 
reporting federal income taxes.  
 
*** 
 
As already noted, this Article establishes that taxability follows ownership, not 
marriage. Verifying the broad application of this principle carries significant 
implications for taxpayers and taxpaying families nationwide. Most immediately, it 
would affect the vast majority of the 581,300 same-sex couples that the federal tax 
                                                                                                                 
 
 13. For the enacted law, see S.B. 1827, 2005–2006 Sess. (Cal. 2006). For the repealed 
provision, see former CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(a) (West 2004).  
 14. Law professor Patricia Cain makes this point in commenting on the 2010 IRS 
guidance: “States like Washington and Texas [both community property states] do not tax 
the income of their residents. The IRS would never accept an argument that because state 
law treats income as a non-taxable item, the federal law should do the same.” Patricia Cain, 
Same-Sex Couples in Community Property States, SAME SEX TAX L. BLOG (Nov. 23, 2010, 
7:23 PM), http://law.scu.edu/blog/samesextax/same-sex-couples-in-community-property-
states.cfm. For more discussion of the 2010 ruling, see infra notes 477–96 and 
accompanying text.  
 15. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 122A.010–.510 (2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 26.60.010–.901 (West 2007). The IRS recognized this reality subsequent to its 2010 ruling 
pertaining to California. See I.R.S., TAX GUIDE 2010: YOUR FEDERAL INCOME TAX FOR 
INDIVIDUALS, Publication 17, at 5, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p17.pdf 
(stating that registered domestic partners in California, Nevada, and Washington “must 
report half the combined community income earned by the individual and his or her 
domestic partner”); I.R.S., 1040EZ INSTRUCTIONS 2010, at 10 (2010) (extending treatment to 
same-sex spouses in California as well); infra notes 497–501 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra notes 502–07 and accompanying text.  
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system does not currently recognize as constituting family units,17 as well as the 8.8 
million remaining members of the gay, lesbian, and bisexual population who may 
also form committed relationships.18 These families, many of which are recognized 
under state law as possessing rights similar or equivalent to opposite-sex married 
couples,19 are prohibited from filing joint tax returns like traditional spouses, a 
prohibition that creates undue complexities, including the application of differential 
tax rates, conflicting state and federal tax rules for the same transaction or form of 
income, and expensive tax planning designed to formalize rights and obligations 
that occur naturally for married taxpayers (such as rights of survivorship). 
Applying the “ownership equals taxability” principle universally under the federal 
income tax could also affect the 6.7 million opposite-sex couples currently living 
with partners outside of marriage20 and the remaining single population in 
committed relationships.  
This Article contributes to the vigorous and increasingly salient debate over how 
to tax traditional and nontraditional families.21 Its conclusions implicate all forms 
                                                                                                                 
 
 17. Press Release, The Williams Institute, New Census Bureau Data Show Annual 
Increases in Same-Sex Couples Outpacing Population Growth; Same-Sex Couples Affected 
by Recession (Oct. 4, 2010). This figure represents a 3% jump from 2008, when the Census 
Bureau estimated 565,000 same-sex couples. See GARY J. GATES, THE WILLIAMS INST., 
SAME-SEX SPOUSES AND UNMARRIED PARTNERS IN THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY, 
2008, at 2 (2009). The actual number of same-sex spouses is probably even larger according 
to researchers. Indeed, approximately one in seven same-sex couples are not identified as 
such by current Census Bureau data collections methods. See GARY J. GATES, THE WILLIAMS 
INST., SAME-SEX COUPLES IN U.S. CENSUS BUREAU DATA: WHO GETS COUNTED AND WHY 3 
(2010).  
 18. GARY J. GATES, WILLIAMS INST., SAME-SEX COUPLES AND THE GAY, LESBIAN, 
BISEXUAL POPULATION: NEW ESTIMATES FROM THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 4 
(2006).  
 19. These families include members of same-sex marriages, domestic partnerships, civil 
unions, and other legal relationships formalized by a state. See infra notes 498–516 and 
accompanying text.  
 20. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Census Bureau Reports Families with Children 
Increasingly Face Unemployment (Jan. 15, 2010), available at 
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/families_households/cb10-08.html.  
 21. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Heterosexual Privilege and the Internal Revenue Code, 
34 U.S.F. L. REV. 465 (2000); Patricia A. Cain, Relitigating Seaborn: Taxing the Community 
Income of California Registered Domestic Partners, 111 TAX NOTES 561 (2006); Patricia A. 
Cain, Taxing Families Fairly, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 805 (2008) [hereinafter Cain, Taxing 
Families Fairly]; Patricia A. Cain, Taxing Lesbians, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 
471 (1997); Bridget J. Crawford, One Flesh, Two Taxpayers: A New Approach to Marriage 
and Wealth Transfer Taxation, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 757 (2004); Anthony C. Infanti, 
Decentralizing Family: An Inclusive Proposal for Individual Tax Filing in the United States, 
2010 UTAH L. REV. 605; Anthony C. Infanti, Deconstructing the Duty to the Tax System: 
Unfettering Zealous Advocacy on Behalf of Lesbian and Gay Taxpayers, 61 TAX LAW. 407 
(2008); Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Equity, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1191 (2008); Anthony C. Infanti, 
The Internal Revenue Code as Sodomy Statute, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 763 (2004); Lily 
Kahng, One Is the Loneliest Number: The Single Taxpayer in a Joint Return World, 61 
HASTINGS L.J. 651 (2010); Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at 
Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983 (1993); Shari Motro, A New 
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of legally formalized relationships, however, personal as well as business. For 
purposes of focusing the discussion, this Article applies the “ownership equals 
taxability” principle exclusively to the family setting.  
Proving that ownership of income and property rather than marriage determines 
family tax liability requires a historical examination. Notwithstanding Seaborn’s 
importance in establishing one of the bedrock principles of the federal income tax, 
we know next to nothing of the historical and jurisprudential developments that 
culminated in the decision. This Article remedies that deficiency. It traces the 
“ownership equals taxability” principle from the late nineteenth century to 1930—
that is, from the decades leading up to ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment to 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Seaborn. It is a story of the early 
federal income tax, of tax avoidance opportunities for families, of the nature of 
spouses’ legal interests as defined by state property laws, and of early tax 
enforcement efforts by the Treasury Department and Congress. It is also a story of 
how the Supreme Court protected Congress’s taxing power and the federal purse by 
articulating an expansive definition of ownership for tax purposes that relied on 
indicia of ownership such as control, management, dominion, beneficial and 
equitable interests, and enjoyment of rights constituent of ownership. 
Seaborn illuminates these legal, political, and sociological storylines. But its 
legacy is as important to this Article as the events leading up to the Court’s 
decision. In the aftermath of Seaborn, the Court continued to articulate an 
expansive definition of ownership and income to curb taxpayers’ insatiable appetite 
for tax avoidance. In its most well-known trust case, the Court wrote, “Technical 
considerations, niceties of the law of trusts or conveyances, or the legal 
paraphernalia which inventive genius may construct as a refuge from surtaxes 
should not obscure the basic issue,” which in the case at hand involved artificially 
shifting income within the family unit.22 But while the Court scrutinized private 
law for contrivances (including instruments such as trusts, contracts, assignments, 
and gifts), it respected, without exception, how states’ general law allocated 
ownership interests within families (both with respect to community property and 
common law regimes).23 It even looked the other way when Congress enacted the 
income-splitting joint return in 1948—an administrative device that treated all 
spouses’ income and property as owned “fifty-fifty” for federal tax purposes—
                                                                                                                 
“I Do”: Towards a Marriage-Neutral Income Tax, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1509 (2006); Theodore 
P. Seto, The Unintended Tax Advantages of Gay Marriage, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1529 
(2008); Keeva Terry, Separate and Still Unequal?: Taxing California Registered Domestic 
Partners, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 633 (2008). 
 22. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940).  
 23. As this Article demonstrates, the distinction between private law and general law 
animated the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in family taxation. In particular, the Court saw 
tax avoidance and artificiality behind “voluntary” or “consensual” private law arrangements 
that reduced tax liability, while it attached legitimacy to “involuntary” and “legal” general 
property law regimes that applied uniformly and without an eye toward tax reduction. See 
Comm’r v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44, 46–48 (1944) (invalidating Oklahoma’s optional 
community property law on grounds that it created a “consensual” rather than a “legal” 
community, enacted solely for federal tax purposes). 
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because the legal fiction of income splitting did not disturb ownership interests as 
defined by state property law.24 
Eighty years after Seaborn and sixty years after passage of the income-splitting 
provision, ownership of income and property remains the guidepost of family 
taxation. Indeed, taxability follows ownership defined by state property law and not 
the presence or absence of a marriage license. This Article removes the false 
barometer of marriage between a man and woman as the basis of family taxation 
and reestablishes ownership principles grounded in longstanding Supreme Court 
jurisprudence as the historically and legally accurate gauge for taxing families. In 
so doing, it argues that Seaborn authorizes members of all state-recognized 
families—marriage, common law marriage, domestic partnership, civil union—to 
file federal income taxes according to ownership interests as determined by state 
law. For those legally recognized families currently prohibited from filing joint 
returns—particularly those restricted by virtue of the Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA), which prohibits same-sex couples from being treated as spouses under 
federal law25—Seaborn entitles them to file two federal tax returns each reflecting 
one-half total family income. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 24. Stephanie Hunter McMahon, To Save State Residents: States’ Use of Community 
Property for Federal Tax Reduction, 1939–1947, 27 LAW & HIST. REV. 585, 621–22 (2009) 
(stating that the split-income provision “did not affect state-defined property rights in any 
way” but merely extended to all married couples “the benefit of income splitting without 
having to divide the ownership of family property between spouses”). 
 25. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of 
any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of 
the United States, the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one 
woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite 
sex who is a husband or a wife.”). On February 23, 2011, the U.S. Department of Justice 
announced that the Obama Administration was taking the position that Section 3 of DOMA 
as applied to same-sex couples legally married under state law violated the equal protection 
clause of the Fifth Amendment and thus was unconstitutional. As a result, the U.S. Attorney 
General directed the Department of Justice to stop defending Section 3 of the statute. See 
Letter from Eric Holder, Jr., U.S. Att’y Gen., to John Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of 
Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html. The policy change with 
respect to defending DOMA does not mean that same-sex taxpayers in legally recognized 
relationships are now treated the same as opposite-sex couples for purposes of the federal 
income tax. Indeed, it could take years before we understand the full extent of the Attorney 
General’s directive (specifically, until cases challenging Section 3 navigate through the 
courts). And even if the government is not willing to defend DOMA, individual members of 
Congress have indicated they intend to defend the law in court in place of the Department of 
Justice. See Frank James & Liz Halloran, Boehner: House Will Defend DOMA; Courts, not 
Obama, Should Decide, NPR.ORG (Mar. 4, 2011, 3:52 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2011/03/04/134268656/boehner-house-will-defend-
doma-courts-not-obama-should-decide. 
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I. FAMILY TAXATION AND AVOIDANCE UNDER THE NASCENT  
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 
The modern federal income tax was born in 1913 after three-quarters of the 
states ratified the Sixteenth Amendment.26 Within months of ratification, Congress 
enacted an income tax law that was modest by any standard. The new levy assessed 
a “normal” tax of 1% on incomes above $3000 for single individuals and $4000 for 
married couples as well as a progressive “surtax” ranging from 1% to 6% on 
incomes above $20,000.27 All taxpayers—single, married, with or without 
dependents—were subject to the same rate schedule.28 As its Progressive Era 
advocates had envisioned,29 the tax fell disproportionately on the rich. Adjusted for 
inflation, the exemption levels created a tax-free threshold for singles and married 
couples, respectively, of $67,000 and $90,000.30 Meanwhile, only taxpayers with 
incomes exceeding $445,000 (adjusted) were subject to the surtax rates, with the 
top marginal rate only affecting incomes above $11 million (adjusted).31 The class-
based federal income tax with its generous zero-bracket levels exempted 98% of all 
households.32 
Under the 1913 statute, married taxpayers could file separate or joint returns at 
their discretion. Families in which one spouse earned all the taxable income filed 
                                                                                                                 
 
 26. See W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY 36–
46 (1996).  
 27. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 166–68. The flat “normal” tax rate was 
assessed on taxable income above exemption levels and below an income ceiling of $20,000, 
while the graduated “surtax” rates were assessed on all taxable income above the ceiling. Id.  
 28. By comparison, since 1969, the federal income tax has contained four different rate 
schedules for individual taxpayers: married individuals filing joint returns and surviving 
spouses; heads of households; single individuals; and married individuals filing separate 
returns. 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).  
 29. See generally CORDELL HULL, 1 THE MEMOIRS OF CORDELL HULL 71 (1948) 
(primary author of the 1913 Revenue Act calling income tax “the one great equalizer of the 
tax burden and therefore a tremendous agency for the improvement of social conditions”); 
ROBERT STANLEY, DIMENSIONS OF LAW IN THE SERVICE OF ORDER: ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL 
INCOME TAX, 1861–1913 (1993) (arguing wealthy Americans and business groups supported 
the progressive income tax to stave off more radical calls for industrial democracy); Ajay K. 
Mehrotra, Envisioning the Modern American Fiscal State: Progressive-Era Economists and 
the Intellectual Foundations of the U.S. Income Tax, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1793 (2005) 
(exploring historical shifts in legal and economic thought among academic economists that 
justified redistributive, ability to pay taxation); Ajay K. Mehrotra, “Render Unto 
Caesar . . .”: Religion/Ethics, Expertise, and the Historical Underpinnings of the Modern 
American Tax System, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 321, 328–33, 345–65 (2009) (examining role of 
“ethical political economists” in the religious and social justice foundations of the federal 
income tax).  
 30. All inflation-adjusted figures are derived from the “CPI Calculator” maintained by 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject, BUREAU OF 
LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm.  
 31. The top marginal rate of 7% began at $500,000, unadjusted. Supra note 27.  
 32. W. Elliot Brownlee, Historical Perspective on U.S. Tax Policy Toward the Rich, in 
DOES ATLAS SHRUG? THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH 29, 41–42 (Joel B. 
Slemrod ed., 2000).  
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joint returns, while families with two earners filed either jointly or separately. 
Separate filing produced tax benefits because the statute allocated a higher 
exemption to spouses remitting taxes on separate returns versus joint returns. When 
filing separately, each spouse was allowed one personal exemption of $3000, while 
one of the spouses received an additional $1000 exemption reserved for married 
taxpayers, resulting in a total exemption of $7000.33 If the spouses aggregated 
family income on a single return, the statute only exempted $4000 from income.34 
Thus, if a couple’s income exceeded $4000, it paid higher taxes based simply on 
whether they filed separately or jointly.  
The potential tax saving associated with filing separately remained small in the 
early years of the federal income tax due to low tax rates. The additional $3000 
exemption for couples filing separately saved taxpayers with $7000 in taxable 
income just $30 because the extra $3000 in income would otherwise be subject to a 
tax rate of only 1%. Even taxpayers at the highest income levels, subject to the top 
marginal rate of 7%, paid just $210 more on $3000 of income if they filed jointly 
rather than separately. And since these taxpayers would have to report exceedingly 
high incomes ($500,000 unadjusted, $11 million adjusted) to be subject to the full 
$210 “penalty,” it was unlikely that filing jointly would motivate them to seek tax 
avoidance devices.  
The number of separate returns comprised only a fraction of all returns among 
married taxpayers in the early years of the income tax. In 1919, only 58,500 
spouses out of 2.9 million married taxpayers (i.e., 2%) filed separate returns.35 This 
figure is significantly lower than the number of married couples statistically 
eligible to file separately. In 1920, 9% of wives participated in the paid labor 
force,36 a participation rate that economic historians recognize as significantly 
under-representing the number of working women.37 Even white married women, 
the female cohort with the highest levels of family income and the most to gain 
from separate filing, achieved a participation rate of 6.5%.38  
The low number of separate filers relative to the percentage of families with two 
incomes may have reflected taxpayers’ confusion over the new income tax. We 
know that the government had yet to work out the kinks in applying separate versus 
joint filing. In a study on the early years of the federal income tax, the Bureau of 
Internal Revenue (BIR), predecessor to the Internal Revenue Service, 
acknowledged that it struggled with “the baffling problem of whether the income of 
husbands and wives living together should be viewed as a unit or as separate 
                                                                                                                 
 
 33. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 168. 
 34. Id.  
 35. Miss Coyle, Joint Returns of Income of Husbands and Wives (Apr. 15, 1941) (on file 
in Office of Tax Analysis/Div. of Tax Research (OTA/DTR) Files, Record Group 56, Box 
54), available at http://taxhistory.tax.org/Civilization/Documents/marriage /hst28695/28695-
7.htm. 
 36. Claudia Goldin, The Gender Gap in Historical Perspective, in QUANTITY & 
QUIDDITY: ESSAYS IN U.S. ECONOMIC HISTORY 135, 142 (Peter Kilby ed., 1987).  
 37. See CLAUDIA GOLDIN, UNDERSTANDING THE GENDER GAP: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY 
OF AMERICAN WOMEN 43–46 (1990) (identifying biases in early Census procedures 
dampening reported female labor force participation).  
 38. Goldin, supra note 36, at 142.  
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incomes regardless of whether they chose to make joint or separate returns.”39 
Levying surtaxes created special confusion. If a married couple filed a joint return, 
the BIR almost always accepted the couple’s reporting position and assessed 
graduated surtaxes on aggregate family income.40 If a couple filed separate returns, 
however, the agency often rejected the couple’s reporting position, and assessed 
surtaxes on aggregate income as if the couple had filed jointly in the first place. The 
policy “did not seem to derive from any clear conception” of how to tax married 
versus single taxpayers, but simply because it was “more convenient in some 
instances.”41 Taxpayers, too, may have preferred filing jointly rather than 
separately for the convenience.42 So long as rates remained low and exemptions 
high, there was little economic incentive to divide income on separate returns.  
World War I changed everything. The Wilson administration relied heavily on 
the income tax to prosecute the war.43 In the process, it made paying taxes 
considerably more painful for wealthy Americans. The Revenue Act of 1916 more 
than doubled existing rates, raising the top marginal rate from 7% to 15%,44 while 
preserving the personal exemption levels.45 The statute also provided a graduated 
                                                                                                                 
 
 39. Louis Shere, Tax Revision 1937—Project No. 3, Miscellaneous and Administrative 
Tax Changes, 4–5 (Nov. 19, 1937) (on file in Office of Tax Analysis/Div. of Tax Research 
(OTA/DTR) Files, Box 54, Folder GA-5/36.1).  
 40. But see infra note 42. 
 41. Shere, supra note 39. The policy seemed to conflict with official Treasury guidance. 
See T.D. 2090, 16 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 259, 268 (1914) (instructing revenue agents to 
aggregate income “for the purpose of the normal tax only. The additional, or surtax, imposed 
by the act will be computed on the basis of the separate income of each individual.” 
(emphasis in original)); see also T.D. 2137, 17 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 48, 49 (1915).  
 42. For this reason, the BIR attempted to glean married taxpayers’ intent when 
examining joint returns. The Treasury instructed its revenue agents:  
Where husband and wife clearly indicate on a single return form the net income 
of each, such a return does not necessarily constitute a joint return. It is a matter 
of intent. Having separated their respective incomes, in the absence of a 
showing to the contrary the presumption is that they intended to file separate 
returns of income, but that for convenience they have used one form. In such 
case both the normal and surtax should be computed on the separate income of 
each. This presumption is, however, overcome if the tax has been computed by 
the taxpayer on the combined net income; in which case, even though their 
incomes have been separated and can be identified, the return is held to be a 
joint return, and both the normal and surtax should be assessed on the basis of 
combined net income.  
O.D. 960, 4 C.B. 255 (1921); see also O.D. 881, 4 C.B. 254 (1921) (allocating wartime 
excess profits tax exemption between spouses); O.D. 909, 4 C.B. 254 (1921) (allocating 
deductions between spouses in community property states versus common law states); T.D. 
3110, 4 C.B. 255 (1921) (allocating income of minor children). 
 43. For the federal income tax during World War I, see W. Elliot Brownlee, Economists 
and the Formation of the Modern Tax System in the United States: The World War I Crisis, 
in THE STATE AND ECONOMIC KNOWLEDGE: THE AMERICAN AND BRITISH EXPERIENCES 401, 
406–07 (Mary O. Furner & Barry Supple eds., 1990). 
 44. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756, 756–57.  
 45. Id. at 761.  
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tax on estates exceeding $50,000 ($1 million adjusted) with a top rate of 10% on 
estates above $5,000,00046 ($100 million adjusted).  
High-income taxpayers charged the Wilson administration with pursuing a 
“soak-the-rich” program.47 They were right. In 1917, Congress gave the 
administration what it wanted, raising rates across the board, more than 
quadrupling the top marginal rate from 15% to 67%, and exposing lower levels of 
income to significantly higher taxes.48 In addition, it reduced personal exemption 
levels for individuals as well as married taxpayers,49 creating more than 100,000 
new income taxpayers. Despite lower exemptions, the levy remained a class-based 
tax, affecting only 15% of all households.50 The richest 1% of Americans, 
moreover, accounted for 80% of federal income tax receipts in 1918 and were 
subject to effective tax rates (i.e., including exemptions and deductions) exceeding 
15%, up from 3% in 1916.51 The Revenue Act of 1918 raised rates again, such that 
by war’s end, personal income tax rates ranged between 12% and 77%,52 while 
estate tax rates reached 25%.53  
In five short years, the income tax was transformed from a “rather tentative” 
revenue instrument into “the foremost instrument of federal taxation.”54 It went 
from imposing a modest 1% tax of $200 on taxable income of $20,000 to 
subjecting that income to ten different tax rates, ranging from 12% to 21%, for a 
total tax of $3,300, a jump of more than 1,600%.55 Increases at higher income 
levels were equally staggering. On $100,000 of income, a taxpayer paid $2,500 in 
1915 and $36,500 in 1918, while at $1,000,000, he paid $60,050 in 1915 and 
$704,530 in 1918.56 
Very quickly, taxpayers faced significant economic incentives to seek tax 
avoidance. Some of the early techniques included gifts of income and property 
(during both life and at death), joint ownership of property, assignments of income 
and property, family partnerships, and a multiplying array of trusts. For taxpaying 
husbands and wives, opportunities to shift taxable income and property within the 
family unit abounded, and increased exponentially in the presence of children. The 
simple act of filing separately rather than jointly could produce significant tax 
savings. In 1918, a husband and wife with $100,000 of taxable income filing two 
separate returns of $50,000 paid $12,000 on each return for a total tax bill of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 46. Id. at 777–80.  
 47. The term “soak-the-rich” taxation was used widely in the United States to describe 
progressive taxation. See Brownlee, supra note 32, at 44 n. 27. 
 48. Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, 40 Stat. 300, 300–01.  
 49. Id. at 301.  
 50. Brownlee, supra note 32, at 44. 
 51. Id. These figures do not account for the incidence of the corporate income tax, 
which would raise effective rates.  
 52. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057, 1062–64.  
 53. Id. at 1096–97. 
 54. Brownlee, supra note 32, at 44. 
 55. Between 1913 and 1915, the first $20,000 of taxable income was subject to a single 
rate of 1%. See Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 166; Revenue Act of 1918, 40 
Stat. at 1062–64. 
 56. Calculated using sources cited supra note 55.  
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$24,000. If the same couple filed jointly, it owed $36,500 with the last $50,000 of 
income subject to marginal rates ranging from 36% to 64%, resulting in a tax 
penalty of $12,500 and a tax bill more than 50% higher. The discrepancy was even 
greater if the couple could split its income not just twice, but three, four, or six 
times by also shifting income to other family members.  
Tax authorities and policy makers were acutely aware of these opportunities, 
and began to track and quantify the tax avoidance. “Taxpayers on large incomes 
and businesses are finding a hundred different methods of legally reducing their 
obligations to the Government,” Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon reported.57 
Wartime surtaxes had “greatly stimulated avoidance, not to say, evasion of the tax,” 
concluded economist Thomas Adams, chair of the Treasury’s Tax Advisory 
Board.58 “Revenues have been falling off, particularly the collections from richer 
taxpayers.”59 In fact, Adams found that taxpayers with incomes over $100,000 
reported net income of $1.6 billion in 1917, but only $600 million in 1920.60 Part of 
the falloff was due to reductions in rates and increases in the personal and 
dependency exemptions.61 But most of the reduction was attributable to high-
income taxpayers incorporating personal property, disposing of income and 
property through gifts, and shifting investments from taxable to tax-free securities. 
Adams was particularly critical of tax avoidance through gifting. He railed that 
“rich men have recently divided their property by gift, conveying it usually to 
members of the family and so dividing the former income into several parts.”62  
Adams likened the harmful practice of gifting among family members to 
married couples in community property states who divided family income in half 
on two separate tax returns. “Practically the same result,” Adams noted, “is reached 
in a number of southern and western states by the community-property laws which 
bring about a division of the ordinary family income.”63 Both practices were “major 
evils” that the government could remedy “rather easily.”64 “Gifts could be made 
subject to the income or estate tax,”65 and Congress could tax the donor at the time 
of transfer on appreciated property or require the donee to assume the donor’s 
basis.66 With respect to the “community-property problem,” Congress could 
prohibit separate filing and require all married couples to combine family income 
for tax purposes.67 Adams commented favorably on the Wisconsin state income tax 
statute, which required husbands and wives to aggregate taxable income and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 57. 65 CONG. REC. 8095 (1924) (statement of Sen. Walsh, quoting Treasury Secretary 
Mellon).  
 58. Thomas S. Adams, Fundamental Problems of Federal Income Taxation, 35 Q. J. 
ECON. 527, 528 (1921).  
 59. Id.  
 60. Id.  
 61. See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227, 233, 243. 
 62. Adams, supra note 58, at 533.  
 63. Id. at 533–34. 
 64. Id. at 534.  
 65. Id. at 534. In 1924, Congress enacted a gift tax to curb avoidance through inter vivos 
transfers. See Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, 43 Stat. 253, 313–16 (1924). 
 66. Adams, supra note 58, at 534.  
 67. Id. 
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property on a joint return.68 He recommended that Congress take “action along 
these lines,”69 a position also advocated by Secretary Mellon.70 Permitting spouses 
in community property states to file separate returns reflecting half the family 
income represented one of the “deeper defects”71 of the income tax and threatened 
the levy’s revenue capacity. 
As part of its crackdown on family tax avoidance, the Treasury persuaded 
Congress to revise the personal exemptions by allocating a single exemption to 
husbands and wives whether filing jointly or separately. Under prior law, spouses 
filing jointly took the exemption for married couples, while husbands and wives 
filing separately were allowed one exemption for married couples and another for 
single individuals. Beginning in 1918, spouses were allocated the same total 
exemption no matter how they filed.72  
The most lucrative tax avoidance opportunities remained available to married 
couples despite Treasury’s best efforts. Husbands and wives could avoid the sting 
of steeply progressive rates by dividing family income on separate returns. They 
accomplished income shifting in a variety of ways, including through gifts of 
income and property, family trusts, joint ownership of property, assignments of 
income and property, and family partnerships. Married couples living in a minority 
of states enjoyed additional income-splitting opportunities by virtue of their 
property law regimes. The eight states that operated under community property law 
treated income and property acquired during marriage as presumptively owned 
equally between husband and wife.73 Thus, under general property law precepts, 
marital income and property was already split in half such that, for purposes of 
reporting federal tax liability, a community property married couple could file two 
separate returns each reflecting exactly half the family’s taxable income. If the 
Treasury Department wanted to eliminate this form of tax saving, it would have to 
abolish separate returns and require compulsory joint filing. In so doing, it would 
have to challenge determinations of property ownership and the nature of spouses’ 
interests in marital partnerships, a determination that had traditionally been the 
exclusive province of state governments.  
II. THE NATURE OF SPOUSES’ INTEREST IN MARITAL INCOME AND PROPERTY 
Under traditional common law, marriage resulted in a unified rather than a 
shared property interest with nearly all incidents of ownership and control located 
in the husband. The reality was not far from Blackstone’s aphorism that the act of 
marriage consolidated the spouses’ otherwise individual interests into a single 
unity—the husband.74 Upon marriage, a wife’s personalty merged with that of her 
                                                                                                                 
 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id.  
 70. See infra notes 202–03 and accompanying text.  
 71. Adams, supra note 58, at 528. 
 72. Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, 40 Stat. 300, 301.  
 73. The eight states included Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New 
Mexico, Texas, and Washington. The other forty states operated under common law. Alaska 
and Hawaii would not become states until 1959. 
 74. Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives’ 
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husband such that all her personal property—including clothes, jewelry, furniture—
were owned by her spouse, whose power over them was absolute. He could literally 
sell the clothes off her back. And while she did not necessarily lose rights in her 
real property upon marriage, a married woman lost the ability to manage and 
control her realty. Her list of disabilities under the common law was long: she 
could neither enter into nor enforce a contract, neither file lawsuits nor be sued in 
her own name, and she was prohibited from executing wills, holding property in 
her name, controlling her earnings (both in market and home production), or 
enjoying any rights in income, crops, or manufactured goods flowing from her 
realty. And although some early colonial statutes extended rights to married 
women, none of them seriously challenged traditional marital status under 
coverture.75  
Over the course of the nineteenth century, traditional common law underwent a 
revolution. Beginning in the 1830s, states adopted married women’s property 
statutes that chipped away at common law marital precepts by providing wives 
legal rights independent of husbands.76 The first wave of statutes protected certain 
kinds of property that married women brought into marriage from their husbands 
and their husband’s creditors.77 Later statutes granted married women additional 
                                                                                                                 
Rights to Earnings, 1860–1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2127 (1994) (“By marriage, the husband 
and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is 
suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the 
husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs everything.” (emphasis in 
original) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442)). 
 75. See, e.g., NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: MARRIED WOMEN’S PROPERTY 
RIGHTS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK 15–112 (1979); JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER, 
AND INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN 80–124 (1991); ELIZABETH BOWLES 
WARBASSE, THE CHANGING LEGAL RIGHTS OF MARRIED WOMEN, 1800–1861, at 1–136 
(1987); Richard H. Chused, Married Women’s Property Law, 1800–1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 
1359, 1384–97 (1983). 
 76. Most scholars identify Mississippi as the first state to enact a married woman’s 
property act. The statute provided wives limited property rights, largely in connection with 
protecting from her husband’s creditors any slaves she brought into marriage. See Sandra 
Moncrief, The Mississippi Married Women’s Property Act of 1839, 47 J. MISS. HIST. 110 
(1985). Four years before enactment of the Mississippi statute, the territorial legislature in 
Arkansas adopted a law protecting a wife’s property from her husband’s debts. See 
WARBASSE, supra note 75, at 159; Chused, supra note 75, at 1399. 
 77. See, e.g., PEGGY A. RABKIN, FATHERS TO DAUGHTERS: THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
FEMALE EMANCIPATION (1980) (finding statutory changes in women’s legal status were 
motivated by fathers’ desire to protect their daughters’ inheritance from husbands and 
husbands’ creditors); WARBASSE, supra note 75, at 160 (concluding “legislators appear to 
have been primarily concerned with keeping the wife’s property from being taken for the 
husband’s debts” and “were really seeking to protect planters from financial disaster as much 
as to defend married women’s rights”); Linda E. Speth, The Married Women’s Property 
Acts, 1839–1865: Reform, Reaction, or Revolution?, in 2 WOMEN AND THE LAW: A SOCIAL 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 69, 74 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1982) (“By leaving the husband 
with the common-law right of management and control of his wife’s property, yet preventing 
that property from being seized for his debts, the early married women’s property acts left 
the husband in a better position to withstand the hazards of the nineteenth-century 
economy.”); Chused, supra note 75, at 1361, 1400–04 (arguing economic panic of the 1830s 
prompted “legislatures to codify a portion of the equitable separate estate tradition by 
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separate ownership interests in property, such as the ability to manage and control 
personal and real property acquired prior to marriage and by gift, inheritance, or 
bequest; to enjoy the profits from that property; to will, sell, or otherwise convey 
property to third parties; to control their own wages; to establish separate estates; 
and to have access to their deceased husband’s personal property.78 Scholars have 
shown that the statutory changes neither “fully emancipate[d] wives from the 
common law of marital status”79 nor reified legal patriarchy.80 The truth lies 
somewhere in between. Given prevailing gender norms, statutory reforms to 
traditional common law never embraced equality between the sexes or shared 
ownership principles.81 Instead, they granted married women limited legal rights to 
separate property and earnings that may have hardened rather than softened 
                                                                                                                 
insulating wives’ property from their spouses’ creditors”). Contra Carole Shammas, Re-
Assessing the Married Women’s Property Acts, 6 J. WOMEN’S HIST. 9, 24 (1994) (“In all the 
acts, pre-1848 and post, the common concern was for the fate of the woman’s patrimony, not 
for male bankrupts.”).  
 78. See, e.g., HOFF, supra note 75, at 117–35 (Hoff outlines six phases of women’s 
property law reform on page 128.); B. Zorina Kahn, Married Women’s Property Laws and 
Female Commercial Activity: Evidence from United States Patent Records, 1790–1895, 56 J. 
ECON. HIST. 356, 360–65 (1996) (identifying three waves of women’s property law reform).  
 79. Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives’ 
Rights to Earnings, 1860–1930, 82 GEO. L. J. 2127, 2127 (1994); see also BASCH, supra note 
75, at 4 (concluding that “[f]ull legal equality for married women loomed as a threat to the 
entire economic structure”); Richard H. Chused, Late Nineteenth Century Married Women’s 
Property Law: Reception of the Early Married Women’s Property Acts by Courts and 
Legislatures, 29 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 3, 5 (1985) (reporting a “loss of special status for 
property owned by married women” in Oregon (emphasis in original)); Chused, supra note 
75, at 1361–62 (concluding married women’s acts “did not legitimate any radical shifts in 
the economic status of women” and “confirmed rather than confronted prevailing domestic 
roles of married women”); Michael Dougan, The Arkansas Married Women’s Property Law, 
46 ARK. HIST. Q. 3 (1987) (finding restrictive judicial interpretation of married women’s 
property laws in Arkansas); Amy Dru Stanley, Conjugal Bonds and Wage Labor: Rights of 
Contract in the Age of Emancipation, 75 J. AM. HIST. 471 (1988) (examining limitations of 
later earnings statutes on women’s claim to wages); Sara L. Zeigler, Uniformity and 
Conformity: Regionalism and the Adjudication of the Married Women’s Property Acts, 28 
POLITY 467, 469–70 (1996) (finding “judicial intransigence” and strict common law 
principles “guaranteed the ancient protections and disabilities of wives and limited the 
legislatures’ ability to remove those disabilities and protections”). 
 80. See, e.g., Kahn, supra note 78 (finding statutes encouraged wives’ 
entrepreneurialism as measured by the filing of federal patents); Shammas, supra note 77, at 
15, 23 (“When viewed from the perspective of the early American period . . . the acts appear 
to be a more important turning point in female status” and paved the way for women “to 
make some decisions about their and their family’s own consumption, investments, and 
wealth transmission.”). 
 81. See Donna C. Schuele, Community Property Law and the Politics of Married 
Women’s Rights in Nineteenth-Century California, 7 WEST. L. HIST. 245, 266 (1994) (under 
reformed common law “any discussion of equal treatment had to proceed from that system’s 
gendered, individualistic notions”); Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman’s 
Rights Claims Concerning Wives’ Household Labor, 1850–1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1116 
(1994) (describing failed efforts to “empower[] economically productive women to 
participate equally with men in managing assets both had helped to accumulate”).  
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traditional gender roles, with the wife responsible for home production and the 
husband responsible for market production.82 
While reformed common law emphasized spouses’ separate interests, 
community property law presumed shared interests in common property.83 
Community property law in the United States was patterned primarily off the 
Spanish system of marital property84 and recognized both common and separate 
property.85 All property acquired during marriage (unless acquired by gift, bequest, 
devise, or descent) was presumptively common property and was shared equally by 
husband and wife regardless of which spouse “earned” the property in the 
traditional market sense. Indeed, according to commentators at the time, “[t]he 
single common element” present in all community property statutes “is the notion 
of co-ownership, and it is submitted that husband and wife may best be considered 
as co-owners of the community property and as such to have ‘equal’ interests 
therein.”86 All “proprietary interests of the spouses are not merely united but 
unified; not mixed or blent, but identical.”87 Under community property law, 
“dependence of the wife” gave way to “conjugal interdependence.”88  
During marriage, the husband acted as manager of the common property for the 
benefit of the community.89 His management powers, however, did not entitle him 
to a larger share of the marital partnership, and the nonmanaging wife had the right 
to disturb her husband’s management in the event he shirked his obligations to the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 82. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 79, at 2131 (describing how the “movement for 
egalitarian law reform . . . work[ed] to modernize and so naturalize an antiquated body of 
status law”).  
 83. See, e.g., WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK & MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF 
COMMUNITY PROPERTY (2d ed. 1971); WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR. & WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK, 
COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES (1975). Traditional common law shared with 
community property law an emphasis on unity of interest. But while the unity under 
traditional common law was contained within the husband, the unity under civil law was 
shared under the marital partnership in which each spouse possessed equal property interests. 
See, e.g., Susan Westerberg Prager, The Persistence of Separate Property Concepts in 
California’s Community Property System, 1849–1975, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1976). 
 84. The only potential outlier is Louisiana. Scholars debate the origins of Louisiana 
community property law and whether it originated from French or Spanish law. See, e.g., 
Rodolfo Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: Its Actual Sources and Present 
Relevance, 46 TUL. L. REV. 4 (1971); Robert A. Pascal, Sources of the Digest of 1808: A 
Reply to Professor Batiza, 46 TUL. L. REV. 603 (1972). While Louisiana property law 
contains elements of both systems, its most salient provisions derive from Spanish law. See, 
e.g., HARRIET SPILLER DAGGETT, THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM OF LOUISIANA 6 
(1945). 
 85. For Spanish civil law, see DE FUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 83, at 126–29; 
RICHARD A. BALLINGER, A TREATISE ON THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF HUSBAND AND WIFE, 
UNDER THE COMMUNITY OR GANANCIAL SYSTEM § 5 (1895).  
 86. M.R. Kirkwood, The Ownership of Community Property in California, 7 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1, 16 (1933). 
 87. Alvin E. Evans, The Ownership of Community Property, 35 HARV. L. REV. 47, 65 
(1921) (emphasis omitted). 
 88. Id. at 67.  
 89. See infra notes 103–12 and accompanying text.  
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community.90 Spouses managed their own separate property during marriage, not 
because of any influence of common law ownership principles, but because 
separate property was deemed to be acquired by “lucrative” sources of gratuitous 
transfer rather than through “onerous” activity for the benefit of the community.91 
Though co-ownership undergirded community property law in the United 
States, the eight community property regimes reflected variations of shared 
ownership. In particular, each state differed in important respects as to the nature of 
the wife’s interest in common property.  
Washington practiced the purest form of community property, reflecting strong 
partnership and equality principles.92 The husband and wife formed a single entity 
under Washington law,93 and the entity (rather than one or both spouses) owned all 
community property in which husband and wife enjoyed equal rights and 
interests.94 The Washington statute made the husband the managing agent of the 
marital entity, but his absolute power of disposition over the entity’s property did 
not create in him a larger ownership share.95  
In Arizona, Idaho, Nevada, and New Mexico, the community property statutes 
emphasized equality of interests between spouses rather than the partnership model. 
Instead of the marital entity owning common property, husband and wife owned an 
undivided, indivisible, vested one-half of the community as individuals. It did not 
matter which spouse held record title in the property.96 Thus, upon the death of 
either spouse, the surviving member of the community took one-half of community 
income and property by right of survivorship rather than by right of succession and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 90. See infra notes 103–12 and accompanying text; see also Evans, supra note 87, at 65 
(“Management and disposition may be vested in one or both, but that does not affect the 
proprietary interests.”); Kirkwood, supra note 86, at 16 (stating that “the superior powers of 
management vested in the husband are to be looked upon . . . as held by him in a 
representative, rather than a proprietary, capacity”). 
 91. See DE FUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 83, at 126–29; REPPY & DE FUNIAK, supra 
note 83, at 129. 
 92. See, e.g., Holyoke v. Jackson, 3 P. 841, 841–42 (Wash. 1882) (describing the “legal 
community” of husband and wife as “a partnership, in that some property coming from or 
through one or other or both of the individuals forms for both a common stock, which bears 
the losses and receives the profits of its management, and which is liable for individual 
debts” (emphasis omitted in first quotation)).  
 93. See, e.g., Ostheller v. Spokane & I. E. R. Co., 182 P. 630 (Wash. 1919); Wasmund 
v. Wasmund, 156 P. 3 (Wash. 1916); Miller v. Maddocks, 107 P. 1036 (Wash. 1910); 
Stockand v. Bartlett, 31 P. 24 (Wash. 1892).  
 94. See, e.g., Ostheller, 182 P. at 633; Marston v. Rue, 159 P. 111 (Wash. 1916); Mabie 
v. Whittaker, 39 P. 172 (Wash. 1895); Holyoke, 3 P. at 841.  
 95. See, e.g., Holyoke, 3 P. at 842 (“Management and disposition may be vested in 
either one or both” spouses, and “[i]f in one, then that one is not thereby made the holder of 
larger proprietary rights than the other, but is clothed, in addition to his or her proprietary 
rights, with a bare power in trust for the community.”). 
 96. See, e.g., La Tourette v. La Tourette, 137 P. 426, 429 (Ariz. 1914); Ewald v. Hufton, 
173 P. 247 (Idaho 1918); In re Williams’ Estate, 161 P. 40 741 (Nev. 1916); Beals v. Ares, 
185 P. 780 (N.M. 1919).  
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paid state inheritance tax or federal estate tax, if any, on the portion that passed 
under the deceased spouse’s will or by intestacy.97  
Texas and Louisiana practiced yet another brand of community property.98 In 
these states, the husband held legal title to community income and property, but the 
interests of the spouses were beneficially equal. The wife’s interest was vested, but 
it was equitable rather than legal.99 Moreover, if record title to community property 
was in the wife’s name, the law considered her the legal owner rather than the 
husband.100 In either case, whoever enjoyed legal title held the property as well as 
the other spouse’s interest in the property as trustee.101 Thus either spouse, as 
trustee for the community, could convey good title to a bona fide purchaser even in 
fraud of the other member of the community.102 
Not all community property laws were created equal. But California’s was the 
most conspicuous outlier. Unlike the other seven community property regimes, 
California law embodied reformed common law principles of separate interests 
more than community property law principles of shared interests.103 It protected the 
wife by giving her the right to manage her own separate property and to prevent her 
husband from mismanaging her contingent interests in the community. But it did 
not make her an immediate co-owner. Because her interests ripened only upon 
termination of the marriage by death or divorce, the wife resembled an expectant 
heir rather than an equal partner during the existence of the marriage. 
To complicate matters, California community property law suffered from 
statutory and judicial schizophrenia. By statute, the husband was granted “absolute 
ownership” of all community income and property,104 which he was free to manage 
and control “with the like absolute power of disposition as of his own separate 
                                                                                                                 
 
 97. See, e.g., Kohny v. Dunbar, 121 P. 544 (Idaho 1912). By statute, the surviving 
spouse was heir to the predeceasing spouse. In the event the husband predeceased the wife, 
her vested interest was freed from the limited control that he exercised over it during 
marriage.  
 98. Commentators at the time noted that although Louisiana community property law 
contained aspects of several U.S. community property regimes, it most closely resembled 
that of Texas. See Evans, supra note 87, at 63.  
 99. See Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co., 195 S.W. 1139 (Tex. 1917). 
 100. See Mitchell v. Schofield, 171 S.W. 1121 (Tex. 1915); Houston Oil Co. v. Choate, 
232 S.W. 285 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1921). 
 101. Compare this to the treatment under California law, where the husband was 
considered the legal rather than the equitable owner of property even if property was held 
solely in the wife’s name. See Mitchell v. Moses, 117 P. 685 (Cal. Ct. App. 1911). 
 102. See, e.g., Edwards v. Brown, 4 S.W. 380 (Tex. 1887); Zimpelman v. Robb, 53 Tex. 
274 (1880); Johnson v. Masterson Irr. Co., 217 S.W. 407 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).  
 103. Susan Prager has documented the “constant tension” in California’s community 
property law “between reformed common law and community property philosophies.” 
Prager, supra note 83, at 1. Between 1850 and 1891, Prager reports that California 
community property law functioned “closely akin to that of a common law state which had 
adopted a married women’s property act. . . . As the husband came to be thought of as full 
and complete owner of the community property, the wife’s earnings began to be treated as if 
they were her separate property.” Id. at 46.  
 104. CAL. CIV. CODE § 172 (approved Mar. 21, 1872). 
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estate.”105 Yet his absolute ownership did not allow him to defraud his wife of her 
interest in the community, which, again, only ripened upon dissolution of the 
marriage.106 If she were merely an expectant heir, with no interest in the 
community,107 how could she also be said to circumscribe her husband’s 
management of property that by statute he owned absolutely? How, for example, 
could she prevent him from assigning her contributions to community income?108 
Or stop him from conveying, selling, leasing, or encumbering the community’s real 
property?109 Or from conveying or encumbering household items without her 
written consent?110 Or from making a gift of community property without valuable 
consideration or her written consent?111 The same statutory framework that granted 
the husband absolute ownership of community property and that removed from the 
wife all present interest in the community also provided the wife immediate 
interests and negative rights that materially qualified the husband’s dominion.112 
Not surprisingly, California courts rendered decisions reflecting the statutory 
contradictions. Charged with determining the nature of the wife’s interest in 
community property, one line of California Supreme Court cases held that the wife 
possessed a “mere expectancy” interest,113 while another held she possessed an 
                                                                                                                 
 
 105. Act of April 17, 1850, ch. 103, § 9, 1850 Cal. Stat. 254. 
 106. See, e.g., Lord v. Hough, 43 Cal. 581, 585 (1872); Payne v. Payne, 18 Cal. 291, 301 
(1861); Scott v. Ward, 13 Cal. 458, 469 (1859); Beard v. Knox, 5 Cal. 252, 256 (1855). 
 107. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 700 (approved Mar. 21, 1872). 
 108. See Act of June 7, 1913, ch. 287, 1913 Cal. Stat. 537 (invalidating assignments of 
wages or salary of either spouse absent written consent).  
 109. See Act of May 23, 1917, ch. 583, 1917 Cal. Stat. 829–30 (adopting § 172a).  
 110. See Act of March 23, 1901, ch. CXC, 1901 Cal. Stat. 598.  
 111. Act of March 31, 1891, ch. 220, 1891 Cal. Stat. 425 (restricting husband’s absolute 
management and control of community property).  
 112. One might even say that the statute provided the wife present and equal ownership 
interests in community property. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 682 (West 2007) (enacted in 1872) 
(“The ownership of property by several persons is either: 1. Of joint interests; 2. Of 
partnership interests; 3. Of interests in common; 4. Of community interest of husband and 
wife.”). Inexplicably, California courts relied infrequently on this statute to deny the wife a 
present interest in the community. See, e.g., Moore v. Neighbours, 273 P. 36, 36 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1928) (statute defined “community interest of husband and wife” as implying co-
ownership, but married women received co-ownership only upon dissolution of the marriage 
by death or divorce).  
 113. See Roberts v. Wehmeyer, 218 P. 22, 27 (Cal.1923) (wife possesses no existing 
ownership in the community); Spreckels v. Spreckels, 158 P. 537, 539 (Cal. 1916) (“heir”); 
Cunha v. Hughes, 54 P. 535, 535 (Cal. 1898) (“by succession” rather than as survivor); 
Sharp v. Loupe, 52 P. 134, 136 (Cal. 1898) (wife taking interest in the community not as 
survivor or co-owner but as “heir”); Spreckels v. Spreckels, 48 P. 228, 231 (Cal. 1897) 
(“mere expectancy”); In re Estate of Burdick, 44 P. 734, 735 (Cal. 1896) (finding wife takes 
interest in community property by succession rather than right of survivorship due to “mere 
expectancy” interest); In re Roland’s Estate, 16 P. 315, 316–17 (Cal. 1888) (finding “estate 
in expectancy of the wife in the community property is dependent upon her survivorship; and 
in the event of her death before her husband, it is deemed never to have existed.” (emphasis 
in original)); Packard v. Arellanes, 17 Cal. 525, 538 (1861) (“mere expectancy”); Van Maren 
v. Johnson, 15 Cal. 308, 311 (1860) (holding “interest of the wife is a mere expectancy, like 
the interest which an heir may possess in the property of his ancestor”). 
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“existing, vested” interest.114 The statutes were not solely to blame for the disparate 
though parallel holdings. Judges reared in the common law tradition awkwardly 
grafted foreign property law concepts onto California’s civil law system, resulting 
in imperfect analogies and inconsistent rulings.115 These jurists were slow to confer 
equal authority on law developed by legislative grace rather than by judicial 
deliberation and precedent.116 They were slower still, to embrace a property law 
                                                                                                                 
 
 114. See In re Brix’s Estate, 186 P. 135, 138 (Cal. 1919) (finding wife could “be awarded 
. . . the whole” of community property upon husband’s death, her half plus his); In re Rossi’s 
Estate, 146 P. 430, 431 (Cal. 1915) (wife takes possession of her interest “by virtue of 
survivorship”); Dirs. of Fallbrook Dist. v. Abila, 39 P. 794, 795–96 (Cal. 1895) (wife’s 
interest “no doubt, more tangible” than the right of an expectant heir); King v. Lagrange, 50 
Cal. 328, 333 (1875) (wife takes possession of her interest as “survivor”); De Godey v. 
Godey, 39 Cal. 157, 164 (1870) (stating community property “belongs to the matrimonial 
community, and not less to the wife than to the husband”); Galland v. Galland, 38 Cal. 265, 
271 (1869) (finding wife possessed “a joint and equal interest with the husband in all 
property acquired during the marriage”); Payne v. Payne, 18 Cal. 291, 301 (1861) (wife 
possesses “undivided” interest in the community); Smith v. Smith, 12 Cal. 216, 225 (1859) 
(emphasizing wife’s “half interest in the common property”); Meyer v. Kinzer, 12 Cal. 247, 
251 (1859) (finding both spouses “possess[] an equal right to succeed to the property after 
dissolution”); In re Buchanan’s Estate, 8 Cal. 507, 510 (1857) (holding property acquired 
during marriage “belonged to the community, and upon the death of the husband the widow 
took one half” as survivor); Beard v. Knox, 5 Cal. 252, 256 (1855) (finding spouses “jointly 
seized of the property,” and wife’s interest “present, definite, and certain”). 
 115. See Cmty. Prop. in Cal.—Estate Tax, 34 Op. Att’y Gen. 395, 402 (1924) (attributing 
“confusion in the decisions of the California courts” to “the fact that the courts have been 
attempting, in their opinions, to apply the terminology of the common law to community 
property, which embodies a legal concept wholly foreign to the common law, and to which 
the terminology of the common law cannot be applied with accuracy and precision”); Robert 
G. Hooker, Jr., Nature of Wife’s Interest in Community Property in California, 15 CALIF. L. 
REV. 302, 302 (1927) (attributing “confusion” to “minds trained to the common law”); 
William A. Reppy, Jr., Retroactivity of the 1975 California Community Property Reforms, 
48 S. CAL. L. REV. 977, 1055–59 (1975) (exploring inability of common law trained lawyers 
to comprehend and embrace co-ownership under marital property law); Schuele, supra note 
81, at 251 (describing “a strong allegiance to Anglo-American common law culture that was 
quite at odds with the prevailing legal culture”); J. Emmett Sebree, Federal Taxation of 
Community Property, 12 TEX. L. REV. 273, 275, 281 (1934) (stating “wife’s interest is hard 
to define in terms of the common law and any theory which regards the interest of the 
spouses as ‘equal, present and vested’ is difficult to apply”).  
 116. In the first U.S. Supreme Court case interpreting community property law, the Court 
acknowledged the difficulty in applying common law principles to civil law systems. In 
Warburton v. White, 176 U.S. 484, 497 (1900), involving Washington community property 
law, the majority wrote that, unlike common law, it was a “misconception” of the civil law 
system “to suppose that because power was vested in the husband to dispose of the 
community acquired during marriage, as if it were his own, therefore by law the community 
property belonged solely to the husband.” The husband was given management and control 
over marital property “not because he was the exclusive owner, but because by law he was 
created the agent of community.” Id. at 494. In Arnett v. Reade, 220 U.S. 311, 320 (1911), 
applying New Mexico law, Justice Holmes explained why courts may have viewed the 
husband as the sole owner of the community: “The notion may have been helped by the 
subjection of the woman to marital power . . . and in this country by confusion between the 
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system that conferred equal rights on married women and that replaced legal 
patriarchy with marital co-ownership.117 
Divining a wife’s property interests in California and elsewhere proved 
exceedingly difficult. In fact, the same court that termed a wife’s interest “a mere 
expectancy” expressed in the same judicial term “no doubt” that upon a husband’s 
death, the wife “took one undivided half of the common property in her own right 
by virtue of the community existing between herself and husband.”118 Heirs did not 
usually take by right of survivorship. No wonder the U.S. Attorney General,119 the 
Treasury Department,120 and members of Congress121 found community property 
law difficult to understand. So did judges. 
III. CO-OWNERSHIP AND THE TAX CONSEQUENCES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW 
The federal government first examined the nature of a wife’s interest under 
California community property law in 1920. As part of an effort to crack down on 
tax avoidance through income shifting arrangements, the Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue requested an opinion from the Attorney General on the federal tax 
treatment of income and property reported by spouses living in community 
property states. In particular, the Commissioner wanted to know, first, whether 
community property spouses, based on their ownership of community income and 
property, were permitted to make separate returns reflecting one-half the 
community income, and, second, whether the gross estate of a decedent spouse in 
community property states should include “one-half and only one-half of the 
community property of husband and wife domiciled therein” on the theory that the 
surviving spouse took the property as co-owner rather than heir.122 The Treasury 
previously examined these questions with respect to Texas community property 
law and concluded that Texas spouses could render separate income tax returns 
reflecting one-half the community’s income from earnings and property,123 and, 
furthermore, that a surviving spouse in Texas could be taxed, if at all, on only one-
half the gross estate of the decedent spouse, because she already owned the other 
                                                                                                                 
practical effect of the husband’s power and its legal ground, if not by mistranslation of 
ambiguous words like domino.” Id. (emphasis in original). 
 117. Prager, supra note 83, at 34–39; Schuele, supra note 81, at 262 (“Legislators appear 
to have been unable to ignore their common-law heritage and may even have been hostile 
toward the property rights of married women.”). 
 118. Payne, 18 Cal. at 301.  
 119. See infra notes 122–57 and accompanying text.  
 120. See infra notes 158–63, 201–07 and accompanying text. 
 121. See infra notes 170–200 and accompanying text. 
 122. Cmty. Prop.—Income and Estate Taxes, 32 Op. Att’y Gen. 435, 436 (1921); T.D. 
3138, 4 C.B. 238 (1921).  
 123. Income Tax—Cmty. Prop., 32 Op. Att’y Gen. 298, 307–08 (1920); T.D. 3071, 3 
C.B. 221 (1920). The opinion concluded that marriage in Texas was a “conjugal 
partnership[],” Income Tax—Cmty. Prop., 32 Op. Att’y Gen. 298, 303 (1920), in which “the 
earnings of the husband and wife belong to them jointly in equal shares,” and where “the 
community interest attaches as soon as the right to the wages comes into existence,” id. at 
306. 
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half.124 The Attorney General now sought to determine the federal tax treatment of 
married couples in the remaining seven community property states.  
Ownership interest in income and property determined taxability of these 
couples, the Attorney General said,125 and state property law would determine 
ownership.126 As early as 1812, the U.S. Supreme Court was “clearly of opinion” 
that ownership of land “can be acquired and lost only in the manner prescribed by 
the law of the place where such land is situate[d].”127 Moreover, the Court followed 
“a principle firmly established” that it must look to state law “for the rules which 
govern [property’s] descent, alienation and transfer, and for the effect and 
construction of wills and other conveyances.”128 Also, where state courts “have 
interpreted state laws governing real property or controlling relations which are 
essentially of a domestic and state nature,” the Supreme Court would “if it is 
possible to do so . . . adopt and follow the settled rule of construction affixed by the 
state court of last resort to the statutes of the State, and thus conform to the rule of 
property within the State.”129 As such, the government was careful to emphasize 
that it was conforming to longstanding practice and “adopt[ing] the rules laid down 
by the highest courts of the various States.”130 
The Attorney General examined each community property state in turn. In 
Washington, the wife possessed during “coverture” as well as upon dissolution of 
the marriage “a vested and definite interest and title in community property, equal 
in all respects to the interest and title of her husband.”131 In Arizona, wives also 
enjoyed “an equal interest” with husbands in community property.132 According to 
the Arizona Supreme Court, the law “gives the husband no higher or better title 
than it gives the wife. It recognizes a marital community wherein both are equal. Its 
policy plainly expressed is to give the wife in this marital community an equal 
dignity, and make her an equal factor in matrimonial gains.”133 The interest of the 
wife was “not a mere possibility—not the expectancy of an heir.”134 Similarly, the 
Attorney General found equal ownership interests in the marital communities of 
Idaho,135 Louisiana,136 New Mexico,137 and Nevada.138 Only in California did the 
wife suffer less than co-ownership in community property. Rather than viewing the 
wife as owner of the community, “the highest courts of that State” held that “during 
coverture the wife has no vested interest in the community property, her interest 
                                                                                                                 
 
 124. See T.D. 2450, 19 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 38 (1917).  
 125. See Cmty. Prop.—Income and Estate Taxes, 32 Op. Att’y Gen. 435, 462 (1921). 
 126. Id. at 461–62.  
 127. United States v. Crosby, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 115, 116 (1812).  
 128. De Vaughn v. Hutchinson, 165 U.S. 566, 570 (1897).  
 129. Warburton v. White, 176 U.S. 484, 496 (1900). 
 130. Cmty. Prop.—Income and Estate Taxes, 32 Op. Att’y Gen. 435, 462 (1921). 
 131. Id. at 454. 
 132. Id. at 438.  
 133. Id. (quoting La Tourette v. La Tourette, 137 P. 426, 428 (Ariz. 1914)). 
 134. Id. (quoting La Tourette v. La Tourette, 137 P. 426, 428 (Ariz. 1914)). 
 135. Id at 440.  
 136. Id. at 445.  
 137. Id. at 449.  
 138. Id. at 452.  
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therein being a mere expectancy.”139 Recent changes to the California statute, the 
opinion noted, did not alter the wife’s unequal interest in community property.140  
The Attorney General concluded that for married residents in all community 
property states except California, “the ownership in one-half of all community 
property vests in each spouse.”141 For federal income tax purposes, spouses in those 
states could file separate returns each reporting one-half the community income, 
and for federal estate tax purposes, only one-half of the community property should 
be included in the decedent’s gross estate.142 In other words, equal ownership under 
community property law was not a tax avoidance device.  
A. The Treasury Department and California Tax “Evaders” 
Subsequent events in California prompted the federal government to reconsider 
its 1921 ruling only a few years later. In 1923, the Treasury Department requested 
that the Attorney General reexamine the nature of a wife’s interest in California as 
a result of recent amendments to the state’s community property statute as well as 
judicial interpretations finding the wife’s interest in the California community to be 
greater than a mere expectancy. The Attorney General conducted a careful review 
of the evolving California community property law from the 1849 constitution to 
the latest amendments of the codified statute.  
Even just considering “the restrictions placed on the husband’s control of 
community property” by recent statutory changes, the Attorney General found it 
“difficult to see how the judicial mind can conceive of his possessing the elements 
of absolute ownership over the community estate.”143 It was clear to the Attorney 
General that the husband’s interest was “only qualified and partial.”144 One line of 
California decisions may have described the wife as an “heir expectant,” but 
another “recognize[d] her property interest in community gains.”145 More 
importantly, the “heir expectant” line of cases got it wrong, according to the 
Attorney General, particularly given the “numerous amendments” to California’s 
community property law since 1917 revealing “the intent of the legislature to 
protect what [those] California decision[s] had failed to recognize—the vested 
interest of the wife in community estate.”146  
                                                                                                                 
 
 139. Id. at 456.  
 140. The Attorney General found that these amendments failed “to make so revolutionary 
a change in the existing rule of property in California as to devest [sic] the husband of his 
ownership in the community property” or “vest in the wife any interest thereto prior to the 
dissolution of the community.” Id. at 458.  
 141. See id. at 462.  
 142. Id. at 463.  
 143. Cmty. Prop. in Cal.—Fed. Estate Tax, 34 Op. Att’y Gen. 376, 383–84 (1924); T.D. 
3569, III-1 C.B. 91, 96 (1924).  
 144. Cmty. Prop. in Cal.—Fed. Estate Tax, 34 Op. Att’y Gen. 376, 385 (1924). 
 145. Id. at 379.  
 146. Id. The California community property statute was “clear, and plainly bottomed 
upon a recognition of a property interest in the wife.” Id. at 385. Legal scholars agreed with 
this conclusion. See, e.g., Hooker, supra note 115, at 308 (“If the wife can get half the 
community property on divorce; if she gets that half by operation of law where the decree 
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The “expectant heir” line of cases lost further precedential value in light of 
federal court decisions determining “the real nature of a wife’s interest” in 
California.147 In Wardell v. Blum, the Ninth Circuit held that a California widow, in 
the words of the Attorney General, “comes into possession of her half of the 
community property, not as his heir, but by virtue of her valid vested interest in the 
community estate.”148 The Ninth Circuit further held that recent changes to the 
California inheritance tax law reflected “manifestly . . . a clear statutory declaration 
that the wife’s half of the community property is not part of the property of the 
deceased husband,” and “even if the case was not controlled by the California 
statute . . . applying to it the rule of law announced by the Supreme Court of the 
United States . . . the result, it seems to us, must be the same,” namely, “‘[i]t is very 
plain that the wife has a greater interest than the mere possibility of an expectant 
heir.’”149 The district court had condemned even more strongly the “expectant heir” 
line of cases. In finding the amendments to the inheritance tax law retroactive, the 
district court opined, “[I]f that act does not recognize in the wife a valid, subsisting, 
vested interest and estate in the community property during the life of the husband, 
language is without meaning and legislation without avail.”150  
Based on the Blum decision and a thorough review of California community 
property law, the Attorney General concluded that its 1921 opinion “can not 
stand.”151 It “must be modified to harmonize” with the Blum decision to reflect the 
“true rule” of law in California that the wife enjoys a greater interest in the 
community than a mere expectancy, which “clearly recognize[s] that the wife’s half 
of community property is not a part of the property of the deceased husband.”152 
The former opinion was thereby amended, approved by the Treasury Department, 
and incorporated into official field guidance for revenue agents around the 
country.153 For both federal income and estate tax purposes, spouses in all eight 
community property states were deemed to own one-half community income and 
property and were thus permitted to file separate returns each reflecting half the 
community’s gross income.  
Demonstrably chagrined and desiring a different outcome, the Attorney General 
withdrew his opinion within two months for further consideration.154 Several 
                                                                                                                 
does not mention the property; if she can revoke a gift even as to specific property; can it be 
consistently said that she takes as an heir, as one who can be defeated by the merest whim of 
the ancestor? . . . An heir has nothing, but a wife has testamentary power.”); Esmond 
Schapiro, Status of Federal Income and Estate Taxes on Community Property in California, 
12 CALIF. L. REV. 99, 100–01 (1924) (arguing statutory changes left no doubt that the wife’s 
interest in California community property was fully vested during marriage). 
 147. Cmty. Prop. in Cal.—Fed. Estate Tax, 34 Op. Att’y Gen. 376, 378 (1924). 
 148. Id.; see also Wardell v. Blum, 276 F. 226, 227–28 (9th Cir. 1921) (finding “wife of 
a decedent acquires upon his death one-half of the community property in her own right, and 
not as heir of her husband”).  
 149. Wardell, 276 F. at 228–29 (last quote quoting Arnett v. Reade, 220 U.S. 311, 320 
(1911)); see also Cmty. Prop. in Cal.—Fed. Estate Tax, 34 Op. Att’y Gen. 376, 377–78 
(1924).  
 150. Blum v. Wardell, 270 F. 309, 314–15 (N.D. Cal. 1920).  
 151. Cmty. Prop. in Cal.—Fed. Estate Tax, 34 Op. Att’y Gen. 376, 378 (1924). 
 152. Id. at 378, 393 (emphasis omitted in last quote). 
 153. See T.D. 3568, III-1 C.B. 84 (1924).  
 154. T.D. 3596, III-1 C.B. 101 (1924). 
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months later he reaffirmed the earlier opinion, but with palpable reluctance. “I am 
constrained to reestablish and reaffirm that opinion,” the Attorney General 
concluded.155 After “a full review” and “a study of the situation presented by the 
California decisions including those handed down by the Supreme Court of 
California since the decision of Blum v. Wardell, and considering those principles 
which must govern the incidence of a Federal taxing statute upon a subject matter 
which is the creation of State law,” the Attorney General was “unable to find those 
considerations which would . . . justify the Government in beginning anew in some 
other case, a juridical controversy which was litigated to a final conclusion . . . and 
in which the Government’s position was fully presented.”156 The opinion was 
limited to the wife’s interest under the federal estate tax, but “express[ed] no 
opinion with respect to the principles which govern the taxation of income derived 
from community property.”157  
Down but not out, the Treasury Department accepted the reaffirmed ruling with 
respect to the nature of a California wife’s interest for purposes of the federal estate 
tax. At the same time, it received permission from the Attorney General to litigate 
the nature of the wife’s interest for purposes of the federal income tax. In a 
document sent to all revenue agents, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue wrote, 
“It is the judgment of the Treasury that public interest requires a final determination 
of the right of the husband and wife each to return separately one-half of the 
community income.”158 The Commissioner expressed “grave doubt” as to the 
legality of the earlier Treasury decisions, because 
the husband has complete control of the community income and may 
dispose of it as he sees fit during his lifetime without the consent of his 
wife. It is obviously a somewhat strained construction to consider that 
the husband has received only one-half of his earnings for income tax 
purposes although he controls for practical purposes the whole.159  
                                                                                                                 
 
 155. Cmty. Prop. in Cal.—Estate Tax, 34 Op. Att’y Gen. 395, 405 (1924). 
 156. Cmty. Prop. in Cal.—Estate Tax, 34 Op. Att’y Gen. 395, 404–05 (1924). At the time 
of the Attorney General’s opinion, and shortly after the Blum decision, two additional 
decisions had been handed down by the California Supreme Court. See Roberts v. 
Wehmeyer, 218 P. 22, 26 (Cal. 1923) (finding no retroactive effect to amended statute); 
Taylor v. Taylor, 218 P. 756 (Cal. 1923) (holding upon dissolution by divorce and without a 
property decree the wife becomes owner of one-half the community property as tenant in 
common with her husband). The Attorney General noted that the two decisions reflected the 
two disparate lines of cases in California, and that notwithstanding the federal court’s final 
determination in Blum, “[i]f confusion existed before so far as the California decisions are 
concerned, it is now the more confounded.” Cmty. Prop. in Cal.—Estate Tax, 34 Op. Att’y 
Gen. 395, 401 (1924).  
 157. Id. at 405. The qualified holding raised questions about the authority of guidance 
issued a few months earlier directing revenue agents to treat California spouses the same as 
other community property spouses for purposes of the federal income tax. See T.D. 3568, 
III-1 C.B. 84 (1924). 
 158. T.D. 3670, IV-1 C.B. 19, 19 (1925). 
 159. Id. The Commissioner was undeterred by contrary Supreme Court rulings, including 
Warburton v. White, 176 U.S. 484, 497 (1900) (calling it a “misconception . . . to suppose 
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The Commissioner was particularly concerned about the tax avoidance 
opportunities created by the “valuable privilege” of separate filing.160 If California 
spouses prevailed in the courts and were found to have a right to file separate 
returns, the government would already owe significant tax refunds for previous 
years.161 Such funds, the Commissioner was quick to point out, would come “out of 
the taxes collected from citizens of other States” who were unable to take 
advantage of this tax “privilege.”162 “In fairness to the country as a whole,” the 
Treasury Department, in conjunction with the Attorney General, would seek to 
expedite a case to the Supreme Court for a final resolution.163 
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE ATTACK AGAINST THE  
COMMUNITY PROPERTY TAX LOOPHOLE 
The Treasury Department also lobbied Congress that community property law 
created unjustified tax inequities. The civil law system perpetrated geographic tax 
discrimination, according to the Treasury, by providing tax savings to a minority of 
husbands and wives in a handful of states. In 1921, the Treasury Department 
crafted a legislative proposal taxing all marital income to the spouse “having the 
management and control of the community property.”164 The plan targeted spouses 
in community property states and effectively prevented them from filing separate 
income tax returns while leaving married couples in common law states free to file 
separately or jointly.165 As in its earlier rulings on the nature of a wife’s interest in 
community property, the Treasury proceeded even though the Supreme Court had 
already ruled that “might” was not synonymous with “right.”166 The “marked 
advantage” enjoyed by married residents of community property states, the Senate 
Finance Committee wrote in its explanation of the Treasury proposal, was 
inequitable in any event167 and had been condemned by both the Attorney General 
and the Treasury Department. “Income which in other States is taxed as a unit to 
the husband,” the Finance Committee said, “is divided between husband and wife 
in States having community property laws, and the surtaxes are correspondingly 
                                                                                                                 
that because power was vested in the husband to dispose of the community acquired during 
marriage, as if it were his own, therefore by law the community property belonged solely to 
the husband”) and Arnett v. Reade, 220 U.S. 311, 320 (1911) (finding despite husband’s 
management powers over community property during marriage, “it is very plain that the wife 
has a greater interest than the mere possibility of an expectant heir”). 
 160. T.D. 3670, IV-1 C.B. 19, 20 (1925). 
 161. Id.  
 162. Id.  
 163. Id.  
 164. H.R. REP. NO. 67-350, at 11 (1921).  
 165. See id. at 13.  
 166. See supra note 159. The Treasury also ignored the recent ruling in Blum v. Wardell, 
270 F. 309, 314 (D. Cal. 1920), to which both the Attorney General’s 1921 opinion and the 
Treasury’s 1921 ruling referred (“[A]gency of the husband as head of the family is much 
broader, and his control and dominion over personal property much greater, than in the case 
of real property; but it has never been supposed, that this difference lessens the estate of the 
wife in community personal property, or calls for a different rule of succession.”). 
 167. See S. REP. NO. 67-275, at 14 (1921). 
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reduced.”168 The proposed change would “restore uniformity of treatment” to 
married taxpayers nationwide.169  
Members of Congress required little convincing that such treatment was 
unjustified. Most of them viewed community property law as a tax loophole that 
should be closed. “Why should the husband of a woman in Arizona,” asked Senator 
Reed Smoot of Utah, “whose wife has no income whatever from property held by 
her, have a less rate of taxation imposed upon him than a man in the same position 
in the State of New York?”170 Similarly, Senator Boies Penrose of Pennsylvania 
saw “no reason why the so-called marital community system in Arizona should 
have a preference in connection with taxation in this relation over Pennsylvania or 
New York. Certainly all parts of the country ought to be similarly treated.”171  
Like the Treasury Department, supporters of the management-and-control 
proposal believed that dominion over marital income and property rather than 
shared legal interests under property law principles should determine taxability. 
“Suppose, as is the case, husband and wife own the property jointly, but the 
husband has the sole management of the property and derives the sole income from 
its use and enjoyment. Having that income, should he not pay the tax on that 
income?”172 Watson answered his own question: “[O]wnership has nothing in the 
world to do with it; it is solely a question of income. The wife does not control the 
income and the husband has no accounting to make afterwards. He does not 
account for a dollar . . . .”173  
The gendered lens of the common law, as much as legislators’ lack of 
familiarity with the civil law, influenced Congress’s perspective. The “only way” a 
wife can access her “half” of the marital income, said Senator Smoot, “is to go into 
court and break the community bond, and in my State the only way the wife can do 
it is by doing the same thing, by getting a divorce.”174 In community property 
states, Smoot opined (albeit inaccurately), the wife had no legal control over 
marital income. “It is not her income unless she dissolves the community interest. 
She does not own it; she does not control it; she cannot invest a dollar of it. The 
husband does that; he receives the income; he has the distribution of it, and he 
ought to pay the tax.”175  
Even if the husband acted as “trustee” for his wife’s share, as some community 
property representatives analogized,176 he could still be made to pay the entire tax. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 168. See id.  
 169. Id. Congressional supporters of the plan also touted its tax equalization effects. See 
61 CONG. REC. 5914 (1921) (statement of Sen. Penrose) (arguing that the plan “proposes to 
place the so-called community property States on an equality with the other States of the 
Union from the point of view of taxation”).  
 170. 61 CONG. REC. 5916 (1921) (statement of Sen. Smoot).  
 171. Id. at 5914 (statement of Sen. Penrose).  
 172. Id. at 5917 (statement of Sen. Watson).  
 173. Id. at 5920. 
 174. Id. at 5921 (statement of Sen. Smoot).  
 175. Id.  
 176. See id. at 6874 (statement of Charles E. Dunbar, Jr.) (“The husband as a rule is 
given by law the administration of this property during the marriage which is in the nature of 
the right of a managing partner at common law or a trustee with very full power of 
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“I do not think there is any limitation on the right of the Government of the United 
States,” argued Senator Oscar Underwood, “to tax the property in the hands of the 
trustee who holds it for somebody else rather than in the hands of the actual 
owner.”177 The trusteeship argument for taxing the husband on only one-half of the 
community income proved as unpersuasive as the partnership argument.178 “It is 
not the same as a partnership at all,” said Senator Smoot.179 He continued: 
If the wife had the right in Louisiana to demand half of all of the gains 
that are received by the husband and take that money and put it in her 
own name, and had a right to invest it no matter whether the husband 
objected or not, then she would control it, and it would be her 
income . . . . 180  
Senator Smoot concluded, “but it is not her income. It is the husband’s income,”181 
and he should remit the tax. 
Community property law did not reflect a more socially progressive property 
law regime, as its supporters suggested.182 Nor was it better aligned than traditional 
common law with political egalitarianism and ratification of the Nineteenth 
Amendment.183 To its critics, it was a tax avoidance device that, if left unchecked, 
would grow into a capacious tax loophole. Suppose a state “wanted to extend her 
community law,” Senator Smoot suggested ominously, “[by providing] that it shall 
                                                                                                                 
administration.”); see also id. at 5918 (statement of Sen. Broussard) (explaining that the “law 
merely permits” the husband to act as trustee of his wife’s share and arguing that “[i]t is not 
his income, it is not his revenue. He only has one half of that and the other half is permitted 
to remain in his custody provided his spouse is willing for him to invest it in her interest; but 
he at no time owns that other half.”). 
 177. Id. at 5916 (statement of Sen. Underwood).  
 178. Community property representatives likened the marital partnership to business 
partnerships. See id. at 6873 (statement of Sen. Ransdell) (reading a letter from a lawyer 
constituent saying “marital community is a partnership, [in which spouses] have an equal 
interest in the profits of the partnership, [such that] Congress can no more force the husband 
to treat the entire community income as his than it could compel an ordinary commercial 
partner to return the entire income of the partnership as his own”). 
 179. Id. at 5920 (statement of Sen. Smoot).  
 180. Id.  
 181. Id. 
 182. Community property representatives underscored enlightened aspects of the civil 
law. See id. at 5915 (statement of Sen. Ashurst) (quoting legal scholar Richard Ballinger as 
noting the law’s “many commendable features,” including “social advancement” and 
inevitable influence over the traditional common law, which “can [no longer] impede the 
development of a system of laws which yield to the wife, in matters of property, the equality 
of interest and right with the husband which Christian justice demands”). Under reformed 
common law, it was less clear whether wives possessed greater or lesser legal interests than 
wives in community property states. In California during the late nineteenth century, for 
instance, “women’s legal status was . . . worse . . . than in common law states with married 
woman’s property acts,” while other community property states worked to “empower 
women rather than simply to protect them.” Schuele, supra note 81, at 263, 281.  
 183. See 61 CONG. REC. 5915 (1921) (statement of Sen. Ashurst) (arguing civil law states 
had long guaranteed legal and economic rights for wives in the same spirit as the suffrage 
movement).  
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not only apply to wife and husband but to every child they may have.”184 If 
Congress had to accept each state’s definition of taxable income, “then a State 
could pass a law claiming not only community privileges for the husband and wife 
but for every child that was born to the husband and wife.”185 Families with six or 
seven children would be able to divide family income “in such [a] way that a man 
could have at least $70,000 or $75,000 [of] income [$865,000 to $925,000 in 2011 
dollars] and never pay a cent of income tax.”186 States would seek to benefit their 
own citizens at the expense of the national government, and tax revenues would 
shrink dramatically.187 
Defenders of the community property system freely acknowledged its favorable 
tax effects. But similar tax saving was also available to common law married 
couples through unrestricted tax avoidance devices. Husbands and wives in non–
community property states could “execute a partnership agreement embodying the 
identical principles” of community property law, and thereby “enjoy all the benefits 
of separate returns for taxation purposes.”188 Moreover, to the extent Congress 
should be concerned about income shifting between spouses, these private law 
partnerships were considerably more superficial than community partnerships. The 
partnerships available to common law spouses were voluntary and authorized by a 
state’s contract law, while community partnerships were mandatory for all 
husbands and wives and carried with them significant legal responsibilities. 
Community property law “impose[d] serious property limitations on the husband in 
the nature of a marital partnership.”189 In fact, the “burdens and limitations” on the 
husband “may well be considered sufficient to counterbalance the taxation benefits 
that now exist and certainly justify the recognition of the community system by the 
Federal Government in its scheme of taxation.”190 Common law husbands paid 
more tax than community property husbands on equal amounts of income, but they 
also enjoyed unfettered command over marital property.  
Common law husbands reaped additional benefits. In the event of divorce, 
spouses under community property law split marital income and property in half, 
while common law husbands could take it all. In addition, a community property 
wife could “will one-half of the property that may be acquired as a result of the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 184. Id. at 5918 (statement of Sen. Smoot).  
 185. Id.  
 186. Id.  
 187. See H.R. REP. NO. 67-350, at 6 (1921) (arguing “excessively high [tax] rates” 
encouraged “various methods of tax evasion,” including income shifting under community 
property law).  
 188. 61 CONG. REC. 6875 (1921). 
 189. Id. at 6876 (statement of Charles E. Dunbar). Community property representatives 
attributed support for the Treasury’s management and control proposal to confusion over the 
civil law system. Id. at 5915 (statement of Sen. Ashurst) (expressing “no doubt” that 
common law legislators “able lawyers as they are, who have been trained under the common 
law found this a perplexing subject and that their intellects could not at once grasp this 
puzzling question of community property law”); id. at 6873–74 (1921) (“[P]rinciples which 
are peculiar to the laws of the [community property] States . . . are not so well known or 
understood by others from the common-law States.” (quoting Oct. 19, 1921 letter from Jesse 
Andrews to Hon. William E. Borah)).  
 190. Id. at 6876. 
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marriage partnership to her twenty-second cousin or to a stranger” without her 
husband’s permission.191 A common law wife “has no such right, and the husband’s 
property is subject only to his disposition by will or the law of inheritance of the 
State.”192 A community property husband, moreover, could not give away his 
wife’s interest in the community, but a common law husband “is not subject to any 
such limitation.”193 And while a community property husband could not defraud his 
wife of her interest in the community or act as a “reckless and dangerous trustee,” a 
common law husband could dispose of marital property “by gambling or in as 
reckless and extravagant manner as he chooses.”194  
In the end, the management and control plan did not make it into the Revenue 
Act of 1921.195 Whether it was the unified effort among community property 
representatives to educate their common law colleagues on the practical effects of 
the civil law; embarrassment that the plan contradicted recent advances in women’s 
legal and political rights; statistics reporting that only a fraction of married 
taxpayers filed separate income tax returns and that recent tax cuts mitigated the 
benefits of separate filing;196 the availability of income-shifting devices for 
common law spouses;197 wariness over impinging on states’ sovereign power to 
determine laws of a “domestic and state nature;”198 or legitimate concern that the 
plan was unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
(by taxing one person on the property of another)199 as well as the Uniformity 
Clause pertaining to Congress’s taxing power (by imposing geographic 
discrimination in applying direct taxes),200 the Treasury proposal went down in 
defeat.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 191. Id. at 6875. 
 192. Id.  
 193. Id.  
 194. See id. at 6875–76. 
 195. See H.R. REP. NO. 67-486, pt. 2, at 1, 11 (1921) (Conf. Rep.).  
 196. See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227, at 233, 237 (lowering top marginal 
rate on individuals from 73% to 58%).  
 197. See supra notes 54–62 and accompanying text; see also Stanley S. Surrey, 
Assignments of Income and Related Devices: Choice of the Taxable Person, 33 COLUM. L. 
REV. 791, 813–14 (1933) [hereinafter Surrey, Assignments of Income] (“[I]f it is the declared 
policy of a state that contractual assignments between spouses are desirable and enforceable, 
the situation does not differ appreciably from that in community property states.”); Note, 
Disparity of Federal Tax Incidence Resulting from Division of Income Under Community 
Property Laws, 40 YALE L.J. 665, 666 (1931) (“Where income is derived from property, 
uniformity in federal revenue exaction is presently possible, since in the non-community 
states an assignment of such property would effect the same result as in the community-
property states.”).  
 198. Warburton v. White, 176 U.S. 484, 496 (1900); see also De Vaughn v. Hutchinson, 
165 U.S. 566, 570 (1897); United States v. Crosby, 11 U.S. 115, 116 (1812). 
 199. See, e.g., 61 CONG. REC. 5918 (1921) (statement of Sen. Broussard) (arguing “no 
man may be required to return property which is not vested in him or does not belong to him, 
and to pay taxes upon it”). 
 200. See, e.g., id. at 5919 (statement of Sen. Underwood) (arguing bill makes “a 
distinction as to communities where the civil law prevails and a division of the property 
under the law rests between the husband and wife. It seems to me that that is a geographical 
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Undeterred, Secretary Mellon urged Congress to include an identical version of 
the plan in the Revenue Act of 1924.201 The “unfair advantage” enjoyed by 
residents of community property states “over the citizens of the other States of this 
country,” Mellon told Congress, cost the Treasury dearly in lost revenues.202 
Taxing community income “to the spouse having control of the income” would 
“restore the equality” of taxation nationwide.203 Mellon’s management and control 
plan fared even worse than the 1921 proposal, failing to make it out of committee. 
The plan increased taxes on married taxpayers in community property states, which 
conflicted with Congress’s desire for across-the-board rate reduction.204 As 
important, community property representatives mobilized quickly against the plan, 
marshaling opposition from elected officials, chambers of commerce, taxpayer 
associations, and citizen committees, while bombarding Congress with letters, 
testimony, and legal briefs.205  
Even in defeat, Mellon was steadfast in his desire to end the “unfair advantage” 
enjoyed by community property taxpayers. He wrote once more to Congress: 
“There is a serious question in my mind as to whether or not any State, which has 
by the sixteenth amendment granted to the Federal Government the right to levy 
income taxes, can make the graduated income tax of the Federal Government 
ineffective by passing a community property law.”206 For the time being, however, 
there was no need for legislative action. The question concerning how to tax 
spouses in community property states was presently before the Supreme Court in a 
                                                                                                                 
division, and if it be a geographical division then the proposal is unconstitutional”). This 
argument would soon prove unavailing. See Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 17 (1927) (“All 
that the Constitution requires is that the law shall be uniform in the sense that by its 
provisions the rule of liability shall be the same in all parts of the United States.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 201. See Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, 43 Stat. 253 (1924).  
 202. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON 
THE STATE OF FINANCES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED ON JUNE 30, 1923, at 9 (1924). 
 203. Id.  
 204. The 1924 law followed the Revenue Act of 1921 by further slashing taxes and 
lowering the top marginal rate from 58% to 46%. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, 43 Stat. 
253, 264, 267 (1924).  
 205. See, e.g., Revenue Revision, 1924: Hearings Before the H.R. Comm. on Ways and 
Means, 68th Cong. 194–97 (1924) (statement of Rep. O’Connor); id. at 195 (statement of 
Walter Parker, New Orleans Association of Commerce); id. at 348–61 (statement of R. C. 
Fulbright, Houston Chamber of Commerce and Texas Taxpayers); id. at 362–63 (statement 
of Rep. Black); id. at 363–71 (statement of John J. Underwood, Seattle Chamber of 
Commerce); id. at 371–74 (statement of Walter Mossaman, Counsel for Association of 
Washington Taxpayers); id. at 375–87 (statement of Charles E. Dunbar Jr., Citizens 
Committee and New Orleans Association of Commerce); id. at 478–82 (statement of Rep. 
Miller): id. at 482–85 (statement of Rep. Summers). After passage of the Revenue Act of 
1924, the Treasury issued regulations recognizing the right of married couples in community 
property states (excluding California) to file separate returns reflecting income which “under 
the laws of the respective States, becomes simultaneously with its receipt community 
property.” T.D. 3640, 26 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 745, 755 (1924).  
 206. Revenue Revision, 1925: Hearings Before the H.R. Comm. on Ways and Means, 
69th Cong. 9 (1925).  
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case originating in California. Perhaps the Court could accomplish what Congress 
had failed to do: “restore the equality” between taxpayers nationwide.207  
V. THE SUPREME COURT AND FAMILY TAXATION: DEFINING OWNERSHIP 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Wardell v. Blum208 and the Treasury 
Department’s acquiescence to the holding209 created a split decision. For estate tax 
purposes, a California wife possessed a one-half vested interest in community 
income and property, but for income tax purposes she did not. The U.S. Supreme 
Court weighed in on the issue with respect to the federal income tax and ended up 
accentuating rather than ameliorating the distinction. 
In United States v. Robbins,210 the Court considered for only the fifth time in its 
history the nature of a wife’s interest under community property law.211 More 
importantly, for the first time, it considered the nature of a wife’s interest for 
purposes of the federal income tax. Writing for the majority, Justice Holmes said 
that a California wife possessed a “mere expectancy” in the community under the 
laws of California prior to 1917.212 As a result, she could not make a separate 
income tax return reporting one-half the community income. All income of the 
community was taxable wholly to the husband. In so holding, the Court reversed 
the district court’s lengthy finding that statutory changes over twenty-five years had 
so restricted the rights and powers of the California husband with respect to the 
community that the wife possessed “a real, substantial, vested, and existing 
interest,” and that the husband’s dominion over the community was “no broader 
than it is in some of the other community property states.”213 Unlike the district 
court, the Supreme Court conducted a cursory examination of California 
community property statutes, relied on dated case law, and disregarded subsequent 
                                                                                                                 
 
 207. Id.  
 208. See Wardell v. Blum, 276 F. 226 (9th Cir. 1921); supra notes 148–50 and 
accompanying text.  
 209. See Cmty. Prop. in Cal.—Estate Tax, 34 Op. Att’y Gen. 395, 404–05 (1924); supra 
notes 147–53 and accompanying text.  
 210. 269 U.S. 315 (1926).  
 211. See Arnett v. Reade, 220 U.S. 311, 320 (1911) (finding New Mexico wife possessed 
present vested interest in community property notwithstanding husband’s management and 
control over community); Moffitt v. Kelly, 218 U.S. 400 (1910) (holding even if California 
wife owned one-half the community property prior to her husband’s death, the U.S. 
Constitution did not prevent the state from imposing a tax on wife’s share); Garrozi v. 
Dastas, 204 U.S. 64 (1907) (holding reasonableness of expenditures made by husband during 
marriage as manager of the community under Puerto Rico’s community property law was 
not a question to be decided by the courts); Warburton v. White, 176 U.S. 484, 496 (1900) 
(holding Washington wife possessed a present vested interest in community property). 
 212. Robbins, 269 U.S. at 327. 
 213. Robbins v. United States, 5 F.2d 690, 697, 702 (N.D. Cal. 1925); see also id. at 705 
(“It is the marriage which creates the ownership; death or divorce merely give 
possession. . . . And the truth and substance is that only one-half of the income really 
belongs to the husband; the other half, in law and right and justice to the wife.”).  
2011] SAVING SEABORN 1491 
 
acts of the state legislature expressing its intent to provide vested rights in the 
wife.214 
The holding was a blow to married taxpayers in California. But the dicta was a 
bombshell for married taxpayers nationwide, particularly those living in 
community property states. The nature of the wife’s interest as determined by state 
courts, Holmes wrote, was to be followed “so far as material.”215 In addition, 
“[e]ven if we are wrong as to the law of California and assume that the wife had an 
interest in the community income that Congress could tax if so minded, it does not 
follow that Congress could not tax the husband for the whole.”216 If the husband 
controlled the income, he could be taxed on it regardless of its ownership as 
determined by state property law. “[H]e alone has the disposition of the fund. He 
may spend it substantially as he chooses, and if he wastes it in debauchery the wife 
has no redress. . . . That he may be taxed for such a fund,” Holmes concluded 
summarily, “seems to us to need no argument.”217  
Congress,218 the Attorney General,219 and previous Courts220 had felt constrained 
by state law characterizations of ownership in locating “the most obvious target for 
the shaft.”221 The Court had liberated them. Community income could “be in two 
places at once,”222 both “wholly the income of the husband and half the income of 
the wife.”223 In deciding whom to tax, courts now had a choice, because both 
                                                                                                                 
 
 214. The Court relied particularly on Spreckels v. Spreckels, 48 P. 228 (Cal. 1897) 
(holding wife’s interest a mere expectancy, and finding no distinction between community 
estates and the separate estate of the husband, even subsequent to statutory amendments).  
 215. Robbins, 269 U.S. at 326.  
 216. Id. at 327.  
 217. Id. (citation omitted). 
 218. In the same year the Court decided Robbins, Congress included a provision in the 
Revenue Act of 1926 indicating that state law was the final arbiter of ownership with respect 
to marital property. See Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1212, 44 Stat. 9, 130 (stating where 
“the wife has a vested interest as distinguished from an expectancy,” income and property 
should be reported “by the spouse to whom the income belonged under the State law 
applicable to such marital community for such period” (emphasis added)).  
 219. See Cmty. Prop.—Income and Estate Taxes, 32 Op. Att’y Gen. 435, 461 (1921); 
supra notes 125–30 (citing Supreme Court precedent). 
 220. See supra notes 127–29 and 211 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court had 
been particularly clear on this subject with respect to determining respective interests of 
spouses in marital property. See Moffitt v. Kelly, 218 U.S. 400, 406 (1910) (finding “nature 
and character of the right of the wife in the community for the purpose of taxation was 
peculiarly a local question which we have no power to review”). When faced with 
interpreting a state statute or rule of property, however, the Court recognized that if state 
decisions were in conflict or failed to establish a definitive rule, it could exercise its own 
judgment. See, e.g., Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932) (invalidating state 
definition of a “lease” as a “sale” with respect to sub-soil rights and holding “[an] Act of 
Congress has its own criteria, irrespective of any particular characterization . . . in the local 
law”); Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass’n v. Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110 (1925) (disregarding state 
classification of a business enterprise).  
 221. United States v. Robbins, 269 U.S. 315, 328 (1926).  
 222. Developments in the Law—Taxation 1933, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1209, 1273 (1934) 
(referring to Robbins) [hereinafter Developments in the Law]. 
 223. Douglas B. Maggs, Community Property and the Federal Income Tax (pt. 2), 14 
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husband and wife could be said to own rights in community income and the 
property from which it flowed. If Congress wanted to tax both members of the 
community as co-owners, then ownership as determined by state statutes and 
interpreted by state courts could be considered “material.” If, on the other hand, 
Congress wanted to tax the husband on the entirety of community income and 
property, then ownership under state law could give way to the husband’s 
“beneficial [interest]” where “the possession of power of disposition [became] in 
and of itself a proper test of income tax liability.”224 In other words, income could 
include “not only property the legal ownership of which is acquired by the taxpayer 
during the tax period, but also property, the beneficial ownership of which is thus 
acquired.”225 In the end, Robbins highlighted that income and property in a marital 
partnership could “be taxed to the person who controls them, although he does not 
own them or the property producing them.”226 That possibility meant that husbands 
in all states could be taxed on the whole of marital income, whatever the wife’s 
interest under state law.227 It also meant that if the husband could be taxed on the 
whole under the federal income tax, the same was true under the federal estate 
tax.228  
The immediate aftermath of Robbins provided ominous signs for community 
property spouses. First, the Attorney General announced that it was considering 
applying Holmes’s dicta to states other than California.229 To help him better 
understand the nature of the wife’s interest in community income, he invited 
community property representatives “to state their views on the subject” and to file 
briefs.230 In 1927, the Attorney General issued his opinion on the subject, 
                                                                                                                 
CALIF. L. REV. 441, 441–42 (1926). Commentators questioned the result. See Douglas B. 
Maggs, Community Property and the Federal Income Tax (pt. 1), 14 CALIF. L. REV. 351, 
365–66 (1926) (“Upon what theory may community income, half of the funds comprising 
which is owned, under the state decisions, by the wife, be said to be wholly the income of 
the husband?”). 
 224. Maggs (pt. 1), supra note 223, at 368. Legal commentators noted the pro-
government features of Holmes’s opinion. See id. at 365 (arguing that the Court’s “position 
is that the doctrine of those state courts which hold that the wife is co-proprietor of 
community property with her husband is material, and would be followed by the Supreme 
Court to the extent of permitting Congress to tax the wife for her interest in the community 
income; but is not material, and will not be followed, to the extent of preventing Congress 
from taxing the husband for the whole”).  
 225. Maggs (pt. 2), supra note 223, at 441.  
 226. Surrey, Assignments of Income, supra note 197, at 811. 
 227. See George Donworth, Federal Taxation of Community Incomes—The Recent 
History of Pending Questions, 4 WASH. L. REV. 145, 159 (1923) (querying whether Robbins 
could be applied to other community property states and concluding that Holmes’s dictum 
applied only to California). 
 228. See Maggs (pt. 1), supra note 223, at 357 n.18 (arguing even if wife received her 
half of the community upon husband’s death as survivor rather than heir, “it is doubtful 
whether any constitutional objection can be urged against a construction of the federal estate 
tax law which would subject it to the tax” (emphasis in original)).  
 229. Donworth, supra note 227, at 164. George Donworth was a Washington lawyer, 
federal district court judge, founding member of Perkins Coie, and counsel for the taxpayer 
in Seaborn. 
 230. Id.  
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withdrawing earlier opinions from 1920231 and 1921,232 and concluding that the 
“problems presented [could] not be settled by any opinion of the Attorney 
General . . .” nor by congressional action.233 Instead, he encouraged the Secretary 
of the Treasury “to arrange for test cases in the courts or otherwise deal with the 
matter as you may think proper.”234 In addition, the Ninth Circuit overturned its 
earlier holding in Blum, finding that a wife in California took her one-half interest 
in the community upon the death of her husband as an heir rather than as a 
survivor, which properly subjected her interest to federal estate taxes.235 The Ninth 
Circuit had already followed Robbins in an earlier case finding a California 
husband taxable on the whole of community income and property, including those 
portions specifically attributable to his wife’s community earnings.236 Other courts 
were also influenced by Robbins in finding that California community property 
statutes did not vest sufficient interest in the wife to treat her as co-owner of the 
community during marriage.237 Indeed, it appeared as if the federal judiciary was 
inching inexorably towards removing the tax benefits associated with community 
property law, in California and elsewhere.  
A. Control, Beneficial Interests, Enjoyment, and Other Indicia of Ownership 
Beneficial interests as well as legal interests evidenced ownership according to 
the Court. An expansive, dynamic conception of ownership was particularly 
appropriate if it curbed tax avoidance, a problem to which the Court became 
increasingly attentive as reports from Treasury and Congress indicated that 
noncompliance threatened federal receipts. In an opinion authored by Justice 
Holmes, the Court held in 1918 that stock dividends did not constitute income 
                                                                                                                 
 
 231. See Income Tax—Cmty. Prop., 32 Op. Att’y Gen. 298 (1920). 
 232. See Cmty. Prop.—Income and Estate Taxes, 32 Op. Att’y Gen. 435 (1921). 
 233. Withdrawal of Opinions Relating to the Wife’s Interest in the Community Income, 
35 Op. Att’y Gen. 265, 267–68 (1927). 
 234. Id. at 269. Meanwhile, the Treasury Department’s Division of Tax Research 
prepared an administrative ruling prohibiting husbands and wives from dividing community 
income on separate returns. Members of Congress from community property states 
intervened, and persuaded the Treasury to withhold its ruling pending test cases. See 
Memorandum from Mr. Tarlean to Mr. Sullivan (June 10, 1941) (on file in Office of Tax 
Analysis/Div. of Tax Research (OTA/DTR) Files, Record Group 56, Box 54), available at 
http://taxhistory.tax.org/Civilization/Documents/marriage/hst28693/28693-1.htm. 
 235. Talcott v. United States, 23 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1928).  
 236. See Comm’r v. Roth, 22 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1927); see also Belcher v. Comm’r, 11 
B.T.A. 1294 (1928) (holding in absence of an ante-nuptial agreement, the whole of 
community earnings taxable solely to the husband). But see Harris v. Comm’r, 10 B.T.A. 
1374 (1928) (finding valid written agreement stipulating the wife’s salary as separate 
property permitted her to report income separately); Estate of Randall v. Comm’r, 4 B.T.A. 
679 (1926) (holding wife domiciled in California entitled to file a separate income tax return 
reflecting separate earnings).  
 237. See, e.g., Hirsch v. United States, 62 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1932); Preston v. Comm’r, 
21 B.T.A. 840, 848 (1930) (following Robbins in taxing all community income to husband 
whose “dominion and control” were not altered by statutory amendments).  
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within contemplation of the federal income tax.238 Two years later, the Supreme 
Court reached the same conclusion, but with Holmes dissenting strongly. The 
earlier decision interpreted a statute that did not reach the full extent of the 
Sixteenth Amendment, which should be read, Holmes urged, “in ‘a sense most 
obvious to the common understanding at the time of its adoption.’”239 “The known 
purpose of this Amendment,” he continued, “was to get rid of nice questions as to 
what might be direct taxes, and I cannot doubt that most people not lawyers would 
suppose when they voted for it that they put a question like the present to rest.”240 
Justice Brandeis also reversed course like Holmes, and articulated a considerably 
more expansive view of taxable income. “In terse, comprehensive language 
befitting the Constitution, [the people] empowered Congress ‘to lay and collect 
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived.’ They intended to include thereby 
everything which by reasonable understanding can fairly be regarded as 
income.”241  
The broad taxing powers of Congress that the Court articulated in Robbins had 
roots in this earlier jurisprudence. As the Court considered taxpayers’ artful 
attempts to avoid taxes by shifting legal ownership of income to other individuals 
and entities, it adopted nontraditional indicia of ownership that went far beyond 
legal title. Control, power, or dominion over income, beneficial interest, equitable 
interest, and enjoyment of rights constituent of ownership all justified taxability. In 
crafting an expansive definition of income and its ownership, the Court operated 
with the “acknowledged purpose of saving the revenue from defeat and preventing 
tax avoidance.”242 Its jurisprudence with respect to trusts and assignments is 
exemplary.  
1. Trusts: Relinquishing Control, Part I 
As part of the Revenue Act of 1924, Congress had enacted “revolutionary 
innovations” to the taxation of trusts,243 effectively taxing the grantor of certain 
trusts on income the grantor never received. One provision taxed the grantor on 
income from revocable trusts if the grantor retained “the power to revest in himself 
title to any part of the corpus of the trust,”244 while another provision taxed the 
grantor on trust income which may be distributed to him, accumulated for future 
distribution to him, or used to pay his life insurance premiums.245 Commentators at 
the time observed that the provisions amounted to “a statutory application of the 
principle of constructive receipt,”246 and that they appropriately addressed 
                                                                                                                 
 
 238. See Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418 (1918). 
 239. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 219–20 (1920) (citation omitted).  
 240. Id. at 220. 
 241. Id. at 237. 
 242. Randolph E. Paul & Valentine B. Havens, Husband and Wife Under the Income 
Tax, 5 BROOK. L. REV. 241, 248 (1935).  
 243. Roswell F. Magill, Notes on the Revenue Act of 1924: Income Tax Provisions, 24 
COLUM. L. REV. 836, 858 (1924). 
 244. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 219(g), 43 Stat. 253, 277 (1924). 
 245. Id. § 219(h).  
 246. Roswell F. Magill, The Taxation of Unrealized Income, 39 HARV. L. REV. 82, 98 
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overaggressive tax avoidance.247 Taxpayers, meanwhile, argued that the law was 
unconstitutional, amounting to a tax on income that was not legally the grantor’s 
but rather that of the trustee (by virtue of the legal estate) or the beneficiary (by 
virtue of the equitable interest). The Supreme Court disagreed.  
In Corliss v. Bowers,248 the Court considered a revocable trust established by a 
husband, with income payable to the wife and remainders to the children. The trust 
instrument reserved for the husband the power to revoke, alter, or modify the trust 
in whole or in part, and he further retained full control over trust investments. 
Justice Holmes wrote for a unanimous Court. “[T]axation is not so much concerned 
with the refinements of title as it is with actual command over the property taxed—
the actual benefit for which the tax is paid.”249 “[I]ncome that is subject to a man’s 
unfettered command,” he concluded, “and that he is free to enjoy at his own option 
may be taxed to him as his income, whether he sees fit to enjoy it or not.”250 Legal 
commentators praised the decision for “preventing tax avoidance,”251 while others 
condemned it for violating the taxpayer’s due process by taxing him on another’s 
income.252 But the case was a relatively easy one for the Court in that it involved an 
unconditional power of revocation in the grantor, evincing “unfettered command” 
over income. The harder cases involved situations “where the command was 
fettered.”253 Here, too, the Court acted boldly.  
In Reinecke v. Smith,254 a grantor husband created trusts for the benefit of his 
wife and children. The trustees were the settlor, one of his sons (also the direct 
beneficiary of one trust and contingent beneficiary of the others), and a bank. Each 
trust authorized the settlor to revoke it with the consent of one additional trustee. 
The Court held the settlor taxable on the trust income. “Congress had [this] power,” 
Justice Roberts wrote for another unanimous Court, “in order to make the system of 
income taxation complete and consistent and to prevent facile evasion of the 
law.”255 Trustees owed a duty to manage trusts faithfully, but they were under no 
duty to resist alteration or revocation of the trust. In the case at hand, moreover, the 
grantor’s command was only restricted by receiving consent from one of two 
                                                                                                                 
(1925). 
 247. See Magill, supra note 243, at 860–61 (opining Treasury was appropriately “seeking 
to prevent . . . evasion” in cases where the taxpayer maintains control over income or 
property “whether he exercises it or not”). 
 248. 281 U.S. 376 (1930). 
 249. Id. at 378.  
 250. Id.  
 251. Recent Cases, Taxation—Internal Revenue—Constitutionality of Applying Federal 
Estate Tax to Tenancy by Entirety, 15 MINN. L. REV. 130, 131 (1930) [hereinafter Recent 
Cases, Taxation]; see also Note, Tax Dodging by the Assignment of Future Income, 40 YALE 
L.J. 663, 665 (1931) (calling decision “indicative of a tendency of the federal courts to 
nullify devices intended to reduce surtaxes by distributing the income among more than one 
recipient”); Recent Cases, Trusts—Constitutionality of Statute Taxing the Settlor for Income 
from a Revocable Trust, 78 U. PA. L. REV. 440, 441–42 (1930) [hereinafter Recent Cases, 
Trusts] (finding decision “commendable in that it carries out the purpose of the legislature 
which was to prevent the evasion of surtaxes by means of estates and trusts”).  
 252. See Recent Cases, Trusts, supra note 251, at 441.  
 253. Surrey, Assignments of Income, supra note 197, at 819.  
 254. 289 U.S. 172 (1933).  
 255. Id. at 178.  
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people, neither of whom possessed an interest to withhold consent. “A contrary 
decision would make evasion of the tax a simple matter,” the Court said.256 “[I]t 
would be easy to select a friend or relative as co-holder of such a power and so 
place large amounts of principal and income accruing therefrom beyond the reach 
of taxation upon the grantor while he retained to all intents and purposes control of 
both.”257 Congress reached a similar conclusion the previous year when it indicated 
that a grantor with power to revest title to any part of the trust corpus, “either alone 
or in conjunction with any person not having a substantial adverse interest,” was 
required to include all trust income as his own.258 Congress’s power was not 
unlimited.259 But where the taxpayer “retains for himself so many of the attributes 
of ownership,” he could not claim to be “the victim of despotic power when for the 
purpose of taxation he is treated as owner altogether.”260  
But what if the taxpayer retained no attributes of ownership? That is, what if the 
proceeds of a trust, revocable or irrevocable, went to named beneficiaries, and the 
taxpayer retained no power to change the designation of the beneficiaries, revoke 
the trust, or in any way exercise control over the trust? The taxpayer could still be 
subject to taxation if he received beneficial use of the income. In such a situation, 
the Supreme Court required a grantor to include in his taxable income the portion 
of trust income applied to the payment of premiums on life insurance policies for 
his benefit.261 In Burnet v. Wells, the Supreme Court found that “[l]iability does not 
have to rest upon the enjoyment by the taxpayer of all the privileges and benefits 
enjoyed by the most favored owner at a given time or place,” nor was the 
government “in casting about for proper subjects of taxation . . . confined by the 
traditional classification of interests or estates.”262 Indeed, according to the Court, 
Congress 
may tax not only ownership, but any right or privilege that is a 
constituent of ownership. Liability may rest upon the enjoyment by the 
taxpayer of privileges and benefits so substantial and important as to 
make it reasonable and just to deal with him as if he were the owner, 
and to tax him on that basis.263 
If a taxpayer enjoyed significant enough privileges and benefits from the 
disposition of income, it was “reasonable to treat the taxpayer as if he had 
ownership of the income or an equivalent of ownership.”264 The value and power 
associated with disposing of income was tantamount to ownership. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id.  
 258. Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 166, 47 Stat. 169, 221 (1932) (emphasis added). 
 259. See Reinecke v. N. Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929) (invalidating an estate tax levy 
where the grantor’s power to revoke was dependent on the acquiescence of a trust 
beneficiary who possessed an adverse interest). 
 260. DuPont v. Comm’r, 289 U.S. 685, 689 (1933). 
 261. Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670 (1933) (upholding section 219(h) of the Revenue 
Acts of 1924 and 1926). 
 262. Id. at 678.  
 263. Id. (citation omitted). 
 264. Developments in the Law, supra note 222, at 1277. Similarly, if a husband created a 
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2. Assignments: Relinquishing Control, Part II 
The Supreme Court’s treatment of assignments of income and property 
paralleled that of its trust jurisprudence. As with trusts, when future payments were 
assigned, “the assignor is merely exercising in advance his control over them,”265 
and “the enjoyment and benefit derived by a person from the payments to an 
intended beneficiary is taxable income” to the assignor.266 The taxpayer was treated 
as having constructively received the assigned income and taxed as if he had 
actually received it. “This constructive receipt is just as effective for tax purposes 
as actual receipt of the income by the assignor.”267 Also as with trusts, the Court’s 
approach to the cases involved its “fear of tax avoidance.”268 The Court inquired as 
to whether “a sufficient quantum of rights has flowed from assignor to assignee to 
bring about a shift in the taxable person.”269  
This inquiry was particularly difficult in the context of the family, where “the 
intimate relationship of husband and wife sometimes enables the consummation of 
transactions perfect in form, but wholly lacking in substance.”270 The Court was 
aware of the heightened opportunity to avoid tax in the family setting.271 A 
disproportionate number of assignment cases involved intrafamily transactions, 
including assignments of partnership interests,272 trust estates,273 rents,274 
                                                                                                                 
trust for the benefit of his wife pursuant to a separation agreement or to enable the wife to 
pay household expenses during marriage, the husband was taxable as a beneficiary of the 
trust in satisfaction of a legal obligation. See Turner v. Comm’r, 28 B.T.A. 91 (1933); Welch 
v. Comm’r, 12 B.T.A. 800 (1928); Van Brunt v. Comm’r, 11 B.T.A. 406 (1928).  
 265. Surrey, Assignments of Income, supra note 197, at 828. 
 266. Id.  
 267. Paul & Havens, supra note 242, at 244 (emphasis in original). 
 268. Surrey, Assignments of Income, supra note 197, at 793; see also Recent Decisions, 
Taxation—Income Tax—Partnership of Husband and Wife, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 1080, 1081 
(1932) (observing that assignment cases “have probably been conditioned by their 
background of bad faith”). 
 269. Surrey, Assignments of Income, supra note 197, at 796 (emphasis in original).  
 270. Paul & Havens, supra note 242, at 255. “‘Bed chamber’ arrangements,” Paul and 
Havens observed, “are difficult to prove or disprove, and diligence is necessary where tax 
avoidance is easy.” Id. at 264. 
 271. See Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670, 677 (1933) (“The solidarity of the family is to 
make it possible for the taxpayer to surrender title to another and to keep dominion for 
himself, or if not technical dominion, at least the substance of enjoyment.”); Kunau v. 
Comm’r, 27 B.T.A. 509, 512 (1933) (recognizing the “necessity for close scrutiny of 
transactions between persons related by blood, marriage, or community of interest in order to 
be sure that their dealings are in fact what they, on face, purport to be as to their validity, 
effect and finality”). 
 272. See, e.g., Balkwill v. Comm’r, 77 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1935) (holding the assignor 
partner-sibling taxable rather than the assignee brothers and sisters); Rosevear v. Comm’r, 
31 B.T.A. 146 (1934) (holding the assignor husband-partner taxable on distributed earnings 
rather than the assignee wife). 
 273. See, e.g., McDonald v. Helvering, 74 F.2d 1005 (D.C. Cir. 1934) (same, assignor 
husband/assignee wife); Brewster v. United States, 9 F. Supp. 686 (Ct. Cl. 1935) (holding 
the assignor sibling taxable rather than the assignee sibling). 
 274. See, e.g., Bing v. Bowers, 22 F.2d 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1927) (holding the assignor son 
taxable rather than the assignee mother), aff’d, 26 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1928); Woods v. 
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securities,275 and commissions on insurance premiums.276 And while ownership of 
income continued to determine taxability, the rule did not necessarily mean that 
“rights will not be contrasted and balanced, and income allocated on vague 
principles of equity and fairness.”277 State law continued to define property as well 
as who owned it, but federal law determined its taxability. As the Supreme Court 
phrased it in Burnet v. Harmel, “The state law creates legal interests, but the federal 
statute determines when and how they shall be taxed.”278 In rendering decisions in 
the assignment cases, the Supreme Court continued to embrace incidents of 
ownership broader than those recognized by the states. In the process, it also 
continued to protect Congress’s broad taxing powers. 
In Burnet v. Leininger, the Court held that an assignment of partnership interests from 
a husband to wife without a change in partnership documents or ownership interests did 
not defeat taxation of the husband on distributed partnership earnings.279 In language 
reminiscent of Robbins that Congress could levy tax on the basis of control, a unanimous 
Court said, “If it be assumed that Mrs. Leininger became the beneficial owner of one-half 
of the income which her husband received from the firm enterprise, it is still true that he, 
and not she, was the member of the firm and that she had only a derivative interest.”280 
Assigning his partnership interest was not the same as transferring “the corpus of the 
partnership property to a new firm with a consequent readjustment of rights in that 
property and management.”281 As legal commentators noted at the time, “a partner must 
transfer a ‘share’ in the partnership as well as profits earned upon such share” to avoid 
tax.282 Assignment of “profits” alone did not relieve the assignor of the tax,283 nor did 
merely assigning “interest” in the firm.284 Similarly, assignment of unearned future 
income, by itself, did not free the assignor from tax on that income,285 nor did an 
                                                                                                                 
Comm’r, 5 B.T.A. 413, 415–16 (1926) (holding the assignor father-husband taxable rather 
than the assignees wife and daughter).  
 275. See, e.g., Van Brunt v. Comm’r, 11 B.T.A. 406 (1928) (holding the assignor 
husband taxable, not the assignee wife); Le Blanc v. Comm’r, 7 B.T.A. 256, 259 (1927) 
(holding the assignor father-employer taxable not the assignee son-employee).  
 276. See, e.g., Parker v. Routzahn, 56 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1932) (holding the assignor 
husband taxable on future commissions rather than the assignee wife); Bishop v. Comm’r, 
54 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1931) (same). 
 277. Surrey, Assignments of Income, supra note 197, at 796. 
 278. 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932). 
 279. 285 U.S. 136 (1932). But see Rose v. Comm’r, 65 F.2d 616, 617 (6th Cir. 1933) 
(holding the declaration of a trust of partnership interests and properties sufficient to relieve 
the partner husband-father from tax on grounds that the trustee family members received 
“rights of partners”).  
 280. Leininger, 285 U.S. at 141. 
 281. Id.  
 282. Current Decisions, Income Taxation—Assignment of Partnership Profits, 41 YALE 
L.J. 925, 926 (1932). 
 283. See, e.g., Harris v. Comm’r, 39 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1930); Rossmore v. Anderson, 1 F. 
Supp. 35 (S.D.N.Y. 1932).  
 284. See, e.g., Battleson v. Comm’r, 62 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1932); Balkwill v. Comm’r, 25 
B.T.A. 1147 (1932) (holding the distributive share of the partnership income taxable to the 
partner, despite the declaration of trust with respect to the beneficiaries). 
 285. See, e.g., Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930) (holding the assignor husband taxable 
on the assignment of future earnings); Bing v. Bowers, 22 F.2d 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1927) 
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assignment of income already earned.286 Control of income and its taxability involved 
both “the right to demand or obtain the income and the right to control it after it has been 
received.”287 If the assignor retained both these rights, he was taxable on the income 
when it accrued.288 Conversely, if the assignor relinquished both rights in an irrevocable 
assignment, he was no longer taxable on the income.289 
More than anything, an effective assignment required the assignor to relinquish 
control, not only over the income stream, but over the source of the income and any 
beneficial enjoyment over the income.290 Thus, taxpayers could not assign income 
from a spendthrift trust because, by law, they controlled neither the income nor the 
trust corpus.291 An effective assignment of profits from the sale of property 
required relinquishing control over the entire property prior to the sale.292 An 
assignor had to assign the contract and not just income from the contract.293 He had 
to transfer the corpus (i.e. tangible property),294 a property right (i.e. covering 
contract rights broader than property transfers),295 more than a mere promise,296 and 
                                                                                                                 
(holding the assignor son taxable on the mere promise to pay future income to his mother), 
aff’d, 26 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1928). 
 286. See, e.g., Daugherty v. Comm’r, 63 F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 1933) (holding the husband 
taxable on an assignment to his wife of undivided one-half interest in contingent fee for 
which he had fully performed).  
 287. Recent Cases, Taxation, supra note 251, at 129. 
 288. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Bowers, 9 F.2d 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1925) (holding the husband 
partner taxable on partnership profits assigned to his wife who had no present interest in the 
partnership assets), aff’d, 15 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1926). 
 289. See, e.g., Rosenwald v. Comm’r, 33 F.2d 423 (7th Cir. 1929) (holding the husband 
not taxable on the assignment of negotiable bond coupons on grounds he divested himself of 
all control, while holding him taxable on assigned stock dividends, interest on a note, and 
rents from real property that he still controlled).  
 290. See, e.g., Comm’r v. Field, 42 F.2d 820 (2d Cir. 1930) (holding the assignor 
husband not taxable on the assignment of trust income to his beneficiary wife on grounds 
that he effectively transferred his equitable estate); Clark v. Comm’r, 16 B.T.A. 453 (1929) 
(holding the assignment alienating equitable life interest as a valid transfer of present 
property right to assignees sufficient to make them taxable on future income). 
 291. See, e.g., Comm’r v. Blair, 60 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1932) (holding the beneficiary of 
spendthrift trust taxable on assignments of trust income). Such trusts are for the benefit of 
persons unable to control their own spending.  
 292. See, e.g., Wright v. Comm’r, 26 B.T.A. 21 (1932) (holding the assignee taxable on a 
pre-sale transfer of an undivided one-half interest in property); Rogers v. Comm’r, 15 B.T.A. 
638 (1929) (holding the assignor taxable on profits from a sale of property assigned after the 
sale transaction); Walker v. Comm’r, 6 B.T.A. 1142 (1927) (holding the assignment of an oil 
and gas lease from a husband to his wife an effective transfer of the husband’s interest). 
 293. See Nelson v. Ferguson, 56 F.2d 121 (3d Cir. 1932); Hall v. Burnet, 54 F.2d 443 
(D.C. Cir. 1931).  
 294. See, e.g., Van Brunt v. Comm’r, 11 B.T.A. 406 (1928) (assigning rental and 
dividend income from property not corpus); Parshall v. Comm’r, 7 B.T.A. 318 (1927) 
(holding the husband’s transfer of partnership interest to his wife sufficient to make a 
subsequent partnership distribution taxable to her). 
 295. See, e.g., Leydig v. Comm’r, 15 B.T.A. 124, 132 (1929) (finding “where the thing 
assigned was a property right, real or personal, productive of income, income thereafter 
arising from such property is income to the assignee by virtue of his ownership”).  
 296. See, e.g., Bing v. Bowers, 22 F.2d 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1927) (emphasizing the difference 
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a right to collect income as well as to exercise interest in the property generating 
the income.297 If the assignor failed to divest himself of all legal, equitable, and 
beneficial interests in income and its sources, he still enjoyed sufficient control to 
justify taxing him on the subject of the assignment.  
3. Income as Consumption and Control as Ownership 
By viewing control as tantamount to ownership, the Court defined the reach of 
the income tax in a way that was more appropriate for defining income under a 
consumption tax. Cases like Burnet v. Wells,298 Reinecke v. Smith,299 DuPont v. 
Commissioner,300 and Burnet v. Leininger301 all moved the income tax “close to a 
‘services’ or ‘flow of satisfactions’ concept of income—the enjoyment and benefit 
derived by a person from the payments to an intended beneficiary is taxable income 
to the former.”302 Taxable income under this theory tracked not only increases and 
decreases in wealth but also increases and decreases in the value of personal 
satisfaction.303 In many ways, the Court’s expanding conception of income 
resembled what modern-day theorists would recognize as the Haig-Simons 
definition. Named for its two most influential proponents, economists Robert Haig 
and Henry Simons, the definition considered income as the algebraic sum of “the 
market value of rights exercised in consumption and the change in the value of the 
store of property rights.”304 “Personal income,” Simons wrote more pointedly, 
“connotes, broadly, the exercise of control over the use of society’s scarce 
resources.”305  
Some commentators at the time expressed concern that this “broad and 
convenient formula” for income could “dangerously stimulate the appetite and 
imagination of hungry income tax collectors.”306 Several members of the Supreme 
Court were similarly worried that a definition of taxable income untethered to 
                                                                                                                 
between a mere promise to pay and an effective transfer of a property right); Colbert v. 
Comm’r, 12 B.T.A. 565 (1928) (same). 
 297. See, e.g., Rose v. Comm’r, 65 F.2d 616, 617 (6th Cir. 1933) (finding that an 
assignment from husband-partner to assignee family members transferred a right to 
partnership income as well as “rights of partners”); Parshall, 7 B.T.A. at 318 (finding the 
assignee wife received a right to partnership income as well as partnership interests). 
 298. 289 U.S. 670 (1933).  
 299. 289 U.S. 172 (1933). 
 300. 289 U.S. 685, 689 (1933). 
 301. 285 U.S. 136 (1932). 
 302. Surrey, Assignments of Income, supra note 197, at 828 (citation omitted).  
 303. See Paul & Havens, supra note 242, at 253 (“[N]ew development of constructive or 
equivalent-of-cash income is but a short step to the ‘flow-of-satisfaction’ concept of income, 
to the doctrine that personal satisfaction is alone sufficient to constitute the equivalent of 
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The Concept of Income—Economic and Legal Aspects, in READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF 
TAXATION 54 (Richard A. Musgrave & Carl S. Shoup eds., 1959). 
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ownership as defined by legal title inappropriately broadened the powers of 
taxation. Justice Sutherland, for one, opined that taxing a grantor 
requires something more tangible than a purpose to perform a social 
duty, or the recognition of a moral claim as distinguished from a legal 
obligation, which, we think, is not supplied by an assumption of his 
desire thereby to secure his own peace of mind and happiness or relieve 
himself from further concern in the matter.307  
While Congress enjoyed broad taxing powers, “the distinction between taxation 
and confiscation must still be observed.”308 In its zeal to protect the revenue, the 
Court may have blurred the line.  
A definition of income that equated control with ownership raised a 
constitutional concern involving due process under the Fifth Amendment. In the 
words of Justice Sutherland, “So long as the Fifth Amendment remains unrepealed 
and is permitted to control, Congress may not tax the property of A as the property 
of B, or the income of A as the income of B” on grounds that B controls A’s 
property or income.309 The Supreme Court first considered this issue under the 
Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Fifth Amendment. In Hoeper v. Tax 
Commission,310 a married taxpayer protested taxes paid under the Wisconsin state 
income tax, which computed tax liability by aggregating spouses’ incomes on a 
single return. A divided Court struck down the Wisconsin statute on grounds that 
the husband had no legal interest in his wife’s income nor did he control it under 
the state’s reformed common law. The Court held: 
We have no doubt that, because of the fundamental conceptions which 
underlie our system, any attempt by a state to measure the tax on one 
person’s property or income by reference to the property or income of 
another is contrary to due process of law as guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. That which is not in fact the taxpayer’s 
income cannot be made such by calling it income.311  
The Court applied the same reasoning to a case arising under the Fifth Amendment, 
finding that both “in law and in fact the wife’s income was her separate property,” a 
separation of interests which prevented the government from taxing her income as 
her husband’s.312 Without legal title or control over the wife’s income, it could not 
be said that the husband owned in any sense—legal, equitable, beneficial—a 
taxable property right.  
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Three dissenting justices in Hoeper saw control where state law did not. 
“Taxation may consider not only command over, but actual enjoyment of, the 
property taxed,” Justice Holmes wrote for himself, Brandeis, and Stone.313 
In some States, if not in all, the husband became the owner of the 
wife’s chattels, on marriage, without any trouble from the Constitution; 
and it would require ingenious argument to show that there might not 
be a return to the law as it was in 1800. It is all a matter of statute. But 
for statute, the income taxed would belong to the husband, and there 
would be no question about it.314 
The majority’s emphasis on “separation of interests” as between the spouses 
“cannot make us deaf to the assumption . . . of community when two spouses live 
together and when usually each would get the benefit of the income of each without 
inquiry into the source.”315 Regardless of the spouses’ statutory interests under 
Wisconsin’s or any other state’s property law, husbands and wives operated as a 
family unit and benefitted from each other’s income. The reality of that shared 
enjoyment and use justified taxing combined family income to either spouse.316 
Under the prevailing gendered view of the family and its common law roots, the 
husband should bear the burden. Taxing combined family income was also justified 
“by its tendency to prevent tax evasion.”317 Although “the law and the evil” had to 
share a just and reasonable relation to pass constitutional muster, the Court had 
regularly held “that administrative necessity may justify the inclusion of innocent 
objects or transactions within a prohibited class.”318 Preventing tax avoidance and 
accounting for the realities of family economics justified aggregating family 
income and taxing it as a unit. 
VI. POE V. SEABORN: OWNERSHIP UNDER STATE PROPERTY LAW  
GOVERNS TAXABILITY 
Holmes’s expansive definition of income went on trial in 1930. Three years 
earlier, the Attorney General encouraged the Treasury Department “to arrange for 
test cases” to determine the nature of the wife’s interest under community property 
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law and to further determine the proper tax treatment of that interest.319 By 1930, 
test cases had percolated up to the highest court.  
In the lead case, Poe v. Seaborn,320 the Supreme Court interpreted the Revenue 
Act of 1926 as applied to the interests of husband and wife in community property 
under the law of Washington. The opinion, authored by Justice Roberts, challenged 
definitions of taxable income that deviated from strict legal title. The relevant 
federal income tax provisions “lay a tax upon the net income of every individual,” 
and “use of the word ‘of’ denotes ownership. It would be a strained construction, 
which, in the absence of further definition by Congress, should impute a broader 
significance to the phrase.”321 The wife’s ownership interest in community 
property, in turn, “must be found in the provisions of the law of the State.”322 
According to the government, the husband under Washington law enjoyed “such 
broad powers of control and alienation, that while the community lasts, he is 
essentially the owner of the whole community property, and ought so to be 
considered” for tax purposes.323 The Court disagreed, finding that while the 
husband was relegated to powers of management and control over community 
personal property, his power was “subject to restrictions which are inconsistent 
with denial of the wife’s interest as co-owner.”324 The “community must act 
through an agent,” not just to discourage litigation between spouses which might 
“subvert the marital relation,” but also to protect the reliance and expectancy 
interests of third parties dealing with one or the other spouse.325 Most importantly, 
a careful review of Washington’s community property statutes and state decisions 
interpreting them indicated that the wife possessed a “clear” and “vested property 
right in the community property, equal with that of her husband.”326  
The Court’s decision was a definitive blow to the position that control 
determined ownership. “Power is not synonymous with right,” the Court 
asserted.327 Control could be indicative of ownership but not determinative. In fact, 
under Washington law, the husband’s control as managing agent of the community 
“was but a recognition of the ownership of another.”328 “The law’s investiture of 
the husband with broad powers, by no means negatives the wife’s present interest 
as co-owner.”329 Under the law of Washington, “the entire property and income of 
the community can no more be said to be that of the husband, than it could rightly 
be termed that of the wife.”330 Thus, married couples in Washington could file 
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separate returns, “each treating one-half of the community income as his or her 
respective income.”331  
The Court held similarly in the companion cases accompanying Seaborn. It 
found that the community property laws of Arizona,332 Louisiana,333 and Texas334 
granted wives in those states present vested interests equal to their husbands in one-
half the community income and property. The equal ownership interests between 
spouses in those states permitted them to file separate federal income tax returns 
each with one-half the community income. 
In addition, by way of certificate from the Ninth Circuit, the Court revisited the 
nature of the wife’s interest under California community property law. In United 
States v. Malcolm,335 the Court considered two questions: (i) under the federal 
income tax, “must the entire community income of a husband and wife domiciled 
in California be returned and the income tax thereon be paid by the husband?”;336 
and (ii) did a wife in California possess “such an interest in the community income 
that she should separately report and pay tax on one-half of such income?”337 
California law had changed since the Court last considered these questions. 
Prompted by the adverse decisions in Robbins338 and Stewart v. Stewart,339 the 
California legislature had enacted a statute identifying the “respective interests of 
husband and wife in community property” during marriage as “present, existing, 
and equal.”340 The Supreme Court considered the above questions in light of the 
legislative declaration.341 Citing Seaborn and its companion cases, the Malcolm 
Court found, first, that a California husband did not have to report the entire 
community income on his own return, and second, that a California wife possessed 
sufficient interest in the community to report one-half the community income on a 
return separate from her husband’s.342 Shortly thereafter, the Treasury Department 
issued a ruling that applied the holdings in Seaborn, Malcolm, and the companion 
cases to the remaining three community property states of Idaho, Nevada, and New 
Mexico.343 By the close of 1931, married couples residing in all eight community 
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property states reported income for federal income tax purposes as co-owners of 
marital income and property. 
 
*** 
 
In the same year that the Supreme Court decided Seaborn, it heard another 
seminal tax case, Lucas v. Earl.344 Both cases involved the taxation of married 
couples living in community property states. But while the Washington spouses in 
Seaborn were found to share equal ownership interests in the community and 
therefore allowed to file separate federal income tax returns, the Earls, residents of 
California, were not. In 1901, Mr. and Mrs. Earl contracted to divide equally all 
present and future income and property.345 Thirty years later, the Court considered 
the tax implications of Mr. Earl’s contractual assignment of personal service 
income to his wife. Justice Holmes wrote for a unanimous Court, holding that the 
assignment did not relieve Mr. Earl of his responsibility to pay tax on the whole of 
his income.346 In language reminiscent of Corliss’s “refinements of title,”347 
Holmes said that the case was “not to be decided by attenuated subtleties.”348 
Rather, it turned on  
the import and reasonable construction of the taxing act. There is no 
doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned them and 
provide that the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements 
and contracts however skillfully devised to prevent the salary when 
paid from vesting even for a second in the man who earned it.349  
Holmes concluded famously: “[N]o distinction can be taken according to the 
motives leading to the arrangement by which the fruits are attributed to a different 
tree from that on which they grew.”350 Artifice did not relieve the owner of income 
from his tax obligations. 
Legal commentators at the time debated whether the Court’s subsequent 
decision in Seaborn overruled Earl.351 But the Court itself distinguished the cases.  
The very assignment in [Earl] was bottomed on the fact that the 
earnings would be the husband’s property, else there would have been 
nothing on which it could operate. That case presents quite a different 
question from this, because here, by law, the earnings are never the 
property of the husband, but that of the community.352  
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In other words, Earl was not a community property case, but rather a contract case. 
In the context of contract law, the tree that bore the fruit was Mr. Earl, while in the 
context of community property law, the tree was the community, comprised equally 
of husband and wife. Earl stands for the proposition that one cannot avoid tax by 
assigning income to a third party who does not already own the income. Seaborn, 
on the other hand, says that husbands in community property states own just one-
half the community income in the first place, and thus owe tax only on their 
respective halves. I tell my students to think of it like this: in Earl, 100% of family 
income flowed from Mr. Earl’s employer to Mr. Earl and then, a nanosecond later 
by virtue of state contract law, 50% of the income passed to Mrs. Earl; 
comparatively, in Seaborn, and by virtue of general property law rather than private 
contract law, 100% of the income flowed to the community in which both Mr. and 
Mrs. Seaborn enjoyed equal, 50% ownership interests. Ownership in Seaborn 
“spr[u]ng by operation of law,” while that in Earl was created “by agreement of the 
parties.”353  
One could argue this view amounts to a distinction without a difference.354 That 
is, whether by operation of law or by private agreement, both shift ownership of 
income and property, both are initiated voluntarily by the parties, and both, if 
validated, result in lower tax liability. The Supreme Court, however, viewed the 
distinction between income shifting by general law versus private law as real and 
meaningful. Moreover, the difference had nothing to do with whether a marriage 
contract was more or less sacred than contracts governing market-based 
transactions. It involved ownership, and it applied as equally to community income 
as to separate income, to community property spouses as to common law spouses. 
Husbands and wives in community property states were co-owners of the 
community, but they enjoyed distinct ownership interests, as distinct and separate 
as the ownership interests of husbands and wives in common law states.  
As Randolph Paul, the “architect of the modern federal tax system,”355 wrote in the 
aftermath of Seaborn, “For income tax purposes a husband and wife are, generally 
speaking, separate persons. This is true in community property states, and is equally true 
in non-community property states.”356 Thus, income shifting by private contract, in both 
community property and common law states, reshuffled ownership interests and 
qualified as a taxable event. Income shifting by community property law, from husband 
to wife or from wife to husband, did not reshuffle ownership interests nor constitute a 
taxable event, because neither husband nor wife had more than one-half of the whole to 
shift. In Seaborn, the Court acknowledged this fundamental characteristic of community 
property law and of family taxation. In no uncertain terms, it held that ownership was the 
lodestar of family taxability.  
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VII. FROM LODESTAR TO LEGAL FICTION 
In the aftermath of Seaborn, family tax issues did not disappear from the Court’s 
docket. Nor did taxpayers slacken their solicitude for tax saving devices. In fact, the 
stakes for achieving tax avoidance went up nearly every year in the period between 
Seaborn and the end of World War II. The Revenue Act of 1932 raised the top 
marginal income tax rate from 25 to 63% and the top estate tax rate from 20 to 
45%.357 The new law had the effect of doubling the effective tax rate on the richest 
1% of households, from 3.4% to 6.8%.358 It also raised tax avoidance stakes for 
middle-income and upper-middle-income taxpayers, transforming what had been a 
class-based income tax into a mass-based regime.359 In particular, it lowered 
personal exemptions for single as well as married taxpayers,360 and raised tax rates 
throughout the middle-income range.361 But that was just the beginning. Congress 
upped taxes again in 1934 and 1935, and almost every year between 1940 and 
1944. By war’s end, the top marginal rate reached a staggering 94% while personal 
exemptions plummeted to $500 for singles and $1000 for married couples.362 
As the value of tax avoidance went up, so did tax litigation. By 1940, federal tax 
matters constituted “the largest group of cases by subject matter on the [Supreme] 
Court’s docket.”363 In the 1940 term, the Court decided an astonishing thirty-four 
tax cases364 and an equally high number (twenty-four) by historical standards one 
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year earlier.365 Taxation, law professor Roswell Magill observed, was “by all odds 
the chief matter of concern of the Court.”366  
To counteract the avoidance efforts that produced litigation, the Supreme Court 
articulated an expansive definition of income and of ownership under the federal 
taxing power. Observers were keenly aware of the trend. “The present Court,” 
Stanley Surrey wrote in 1941, “has already indicated that the steady broadening of 
the concept of income which characterized the past decade will continue, but at a 
pace so accelerated that it almost dwarfs the progress of that decade.”367 Others 
noted the Court’s increased willingness to explore the outer reaches of Congress’s 
taxing power rather than the four corners of statutes as written. In more and more 
cases, the “broad sweep” of what constituted gross income “was construed to 
indicate Congressional purpose to use the full measure of the taxing power.”368 
Quite consciously, the Court “resorted to sweeping theoretical observations to 
prevent the obvious escape from the surtax.”369 “While it is true that economic gain 
is not always taxable as income,” the Court wrote in Helvering v. Bruun, “it is 
settled that the realization of gain need not be in cash derived from the sale of an 
asset.”370 “Economic gain” occurred whenever an asset appreciated in value, and 
the Constitution provided few restrictions on when the government could tax that 
appreciation. Determining when it was appropriate to levy a tax had to be framed 
“in practical terms and must be shaped by considerations of administrative 
convenience and taxpayer convenience. A constitutional strait-jacket imposed by 
the Court would not be conducive to such an answer.”371 In the face of aggressive 
tax avoidance behavior, “[l]egislative ingenuity need not be the sole response to 
taxpayer ingenuity.”372 
Judicial resourcefulness was also necessary to protect the revenue, particularly 
with respect to family taxation. When analyzing the Court’s family tax 
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jurisprudence, one had to “sharply differentiate the statutory and constitutional 
aspects. What the statute provides is one thing; what the statute may or can provide, 
under the Constitution, is another thing.”373 Ownership remained the guidepost for 
analysis, and the Court continued to rely on incidents of ownership beyond strict 
legal title to frame a broad definition of taxability. “Technical considerations,” the 
Court warned in its most famous trust case, Helvering v. Clifford, “niceties of the 
law of trusts or conveyances, or the legal paraphernalia which inventive genius may 
construct as a refuge from surtaxes should not obscure the basic issue,” which in 
the case at hand involved “the normal consequences of family solidarity.”374 In 
Clifford and other family tax cases, observers noted that the Court was “firmly 
insisting that the realities of the situation must not be forgotten in the confusion of 
technical arguments. In each case the reality” of the taxpayer’s position reflected an 
attempt to avoid tax “by a transaction having no substance in itself and deriving its 
meaning only from the effort at tax reduction.”375 
Adhering to the letter of the law did not guarantee validation by the Court.376 
The family unit provided far too many avenues of escape for the Court to accept a 
taxpayer’s transaction at face value. In Clifford, the applicable statute said that 
income from a trust was taxable to beneficiaries if distributable, taxable to the trust 
if not distributable, but never taxable to the grantor.377 The Court largely ignored 
this directive, and examined the transaction under Congress’s taxing power. The 
question was not whether the taxpayer fit into the form of the trust statutes, but 
“whether the grantor after the trust has been established may still be treated, under 
this statutory scheme, as the owner of the corpus.”378 The answer to the question 
required “special scrutiny of the arrangement,” particularly “where the grantor is 
the trustee and the beneficiaries are members of his family group . . . lest what is in 
reality but one economic unit be multiplied into two or more.”379 Under its 
sweeping analysis, the Court found “at best a temporary reallocation of income 
within an intimate family group. Since the income remains in the family and since 
the husband retains control over the investment, he has rather complete assurance 
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that the trust will not effect any substantial change in his economic position.”380 In 
similar fashion, the Court looked beyond the statute and probed the outer reaches of 
the Sixteenth Amendment in holding the grantor taxable in cases involving trusts 
established for the payment of alimony,381 the support of minor children,382 and the 
satisfaction of debts.383 Control over income, enjoyment in the power of its 
disposition, and satisfaction in delivering it to intended recipients also guided the 
Court in taxing donors on gifts of interest-bearing coupons384 and assignor-
beneficiaries on assignments of trust income.385  
Under its expansive definition of ownership, the Court could choose whomever 
to give the “shaft.”386 The assignee of future salary payments was taxable due to an 
increase in wealth as the new owner, while the assignor was taxable as the old 
owner enjoying the power of disposition. Similarly, in the context of divided 
property interests, the grantor/assignor/donor could be taxed if he actually received 
the income as well as if he enjoyed disposing of it in satisfaction of some other 
obligation, while the beneficiary/assignee/donee could be taxed as the new owner 
of income-bearing property. Faced with taxpayers’ insatiable appetite for tax 
avoidance, the Court relied on a mix of statutory, constitutional, and philosophical 
arguments to protect the revenue. 
A. Politics of Tax Avoidance and Taxing the Family 
Meanwhile, the Treasury Department was busy prosecuting its own anti-
avoidance war. It received inspiration from President Franklin Roosevelt, who 
railed against tax “loopholes” that provided an “unfair advantage [to] the few.”387 
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ownership of income and, in turn, of taxability. See, e.g., Pavenstedt, supra note 368, at 230 
(noting “quantum of control” as “the all-important—and perhaps, it may be ventured, the 
solely decisive—factor when considering” taxability). 
 381. See, e.g., Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1, 10 (1935) (finding “no warrant for a 
construction [of the statutes] which would preclude the laying of the tax against the one who 
through the discharge of his obligation enjoys the benefit of the income as though he had 
personally received it”). But see Helvering v. Fuller, 310 U.S. 69 (1940) (holding the grantor 
husband not taxable on income from an alimony trust where the trust discharged his duty of 
support). Cf. Helvering v. Leonard, 310 U.S. 80 (1940) (holding the grantor husband taxable 
on the income from an alimony trust where the state granting the divorce retained the power 
to modify the divorce decree).  
 382. See, e.g., Helvering v. Schweitzer, 296 U.S. 551 (1935) (mem.) (per curiam); 
Helvering v. Stokes, 296 U.S. 551 (1935) (mem.) (per curiam).  
 383. See, e.g., Helvering v. Blumenthal, 296 U.S. 552 (1935). 
 384. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 117–18 (1940) (“[The] power to dispose of 
income is the equivalent of ownership of it.”); see also Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122, 
124 (1940) (holding the assignor husband taxable on an assignment to his wife of renewal 
insurance commissions payable in the future). 
 385. See Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579, 581–82 (1941) (holding the assignor 
mother taxable on income assigned to her children from a trust of which she was the 
beneficiary).  
 386. See United States v. Robbins, 269 U.S. 315, 328 (1925).  
 387. Franklin D. Roosevelt, A Message to the Congress on Tax Revision, in 4 PUBLIC 
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Tax avoidance was as bad as tax evasion. “‘Tax avoidance’ means you hire a 
$250,000-fee lawyer,” Roosevelt said, “and he changes the word ‘evasion’ into the 
word ‘avoidance.’”388 Both were “inequitable and undemocratic,” and both had 
been getting worse.389 In 1937, after persuading the tax-writing committees in 
Congress to create a Joint Committee on Tax Evasion and Avoidance, Roosevelt 
argued that avoidance and evasion had become “so widespread and so amazing 
both in their boldness and their ingenuity, that further action without delay seems 
imperative.”390 Invoking the words of recently deceased Justice Holmes, Roosevelt 
wrote to Congress: “‘Taxes are what we pay for civilized society.’ Too many 
individuals, however, want the civilization at a discount.”391  
Roosevelt’s Treasury Department identified eleven “principal devices” used by 
taxpayers “with large incomes for the purpose of defeating the income taxes.”392 
Chief among them were three techniques to shift income within the family: trusts, 
partnerships, and community property law, the last of which Treasury Secretary 
Henry Morgenthau called “unjustifiable.”393 All told, $193 million ($2.97 billion in 
2011 dollars) in tax revenue was lost annually to separate returns: $159 million 
($2.44 billion) from income shifting among common law spouses and another $34 
million ($522 million) from community property couples.394 As a solution to the 
revenue loss, the Treasury recommended that Congress enact compulsory joint 
returns, requiring spouses wherever resident to aggregate family income on a single 
return with tax liability apportioned according to spouses’ respective earned 
income shares.395 Congress took no action on the recommendation,396 but Treasury 
pushed ahead in crafting solutions to family tax avoidance. 
Beginning in the mid-1930s, the Treasury Department devoted considerable 
time to studying family taxation. In the process, it adopted a holistic approach, 
seeking a solution involving all separate returns and not just those filed by 
                                                                                                                 
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 270, 271 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 
1938). 
 388. Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Two Hundred and Twenty-Fifth Press Conference, in 4 
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 312, 313 (Samuel I. Rosenman 
ed., 1938). 
 389. Id.  
 390. Franklin D. Roosevelt, The President Urges Legislation to Prevent Tax Evasion, in 
1937 PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 238 (Samuel I. Rosenman 
ed., 1941). 
 391. Id. 
 392. Id. at 239–45 (statement of Henry Morgenthau, Jr.). 
 393. Id. at 244; see also Randolph E. Paul, The Background of the Revenue Act of 1937, 5 
U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 71–77, 84–85 (1937) (discussing family tax avoidance techniques in the 
context of the 1937 bill). 
 394. Tax Evasion and Avoidance: Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Tax Evasion 
and Avoidance, 75th Cong. 310 (1937) (statement of Roswell Magill, Undersecretary of the 
Treasury).  
 395. Id.; see also id. at 17–21, 33–34. The plan was similar to the one that Treasury had 
recommended in 1933 and 1934. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-704, pt. 1, at 3, 43–44, 113 (1934). 
The pro-rata allocation between husband and wife was designed to overcome due process 
concerns raised in Hoeper pertaining to taxing one spouse on the income of another.  
 396. See H.R. REP. NO. 75-1546 (1937).  
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community property spouses.397 It quantified the number of separate returns,398 the 
lost revenue associated with separate filing,399 and which families it benefited.400 
Treasury also evaluated “the complexity of the marital relationship”401 and 
fundamental questions such as “how marital status should affect tax liability,”402 
how to treat economies of scale in households of varying size,403 and how to 
account for imputed income of stay-at-home spouses404 as well as additional 
                                                                                                                 
 
 397. See, e.g., Carl Shoup, Suggestions for Study of Taxation of Community Property, 1–
2 (Sept. 19, 1939) (on file in Office of Tax Analysis/Div. of Tax Research (OTA/DTR) 
Files, Box 54, Folder GA-5/39.5) (urging a coherent approach that viewed the “community 
property problem” alongside “the general treatment of married versus single taxpayers”).  
 398. See, e.g., Miss Coyle, supra note 35, at Table 1 (finding that the number of separate 
returns jumped nearly 60% between 1935 and 1939); Martin Atlas, Separate and Joint 
Returns of Husbands and Wives: Comparison of Tax Under Present Law and Treasury 
Proposal (Apr. 16, 1941) (on file in Office of Tax Analysis/Div. of Tax Research 
(OTA/DTR) Files, Box 54, Folder GA-5/41.3); Miss Coyle and Staff, Present Distribution of 
Separate Returns of Husbands and Wives Classified by Size of Their Combined Net Incomes, 
1936 (June 7, 1941) (on file in Office of Tax Analysis/Div. of Tax Research (OTA/DTR) 
Files, Box 54, Folder GA-5/41.12).  
 399. See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1942: Hearing on H.R. 7378 Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 
77th Cong. 8–9 (1942) (statement of Henry Morgenthau) (separate returns costing $400 
million annually); Mr. Haas to Mr. Blough (Nov. 13, 1941), cited in Miss Coyle, supra note 
35 (citing another source) (reporting separate returns costing $353 million annually).  
 400. See, e.g., TREASURY DEP’T, THE TAX TREATMENT OF FAMILY INCOME (1947), in 
Revenue Revisions, 1947–48: Hearings Before the H. Comm. Ways and Means, 80th Cong. 
859 (1947); Mr. Fefferman, Comments on Mr. Turner’s Memorandum Regarding a Plan to 
Allow Husbands and Wives in All States the Option of Equal Division of Income for Tax 
Purposes, 5 (Dec. 6, 1946) (on file in Office of Tax Analysis/Div. of Tax Research 
(OTA/DTR) Files, Box 54, Folder GA-5/46.7); Mr. Turner to Dr. Atkeson, Analysis of 
Effects on Tax Revenue and Individual Burdens on Equalizing Tax Treatment of Community 
and Noncommunity Income, 2–6 (July 13, 1946) (on file in Office of Tax Analysis/Div. of 
Tax Research (OTA/DTR) Files, Box 54, Folder GA-5/46.7); Anita Wells, Difference in 
Federal Income Tax on Incomes of Specified Size in Community Property and Non-
Community Property States, 1935–1944 (Aug. 14, 1943) (on file in Office of Tax 
Analysis/Div. of Tax Research (OTA/DTR) Files, Box 54, Folder GA-5/43.4).  
 401. Roy Blough to Mr. Hanes, Comment on Mr. Wood’s “Alternative Plan for 
Eliminating Inequalities in Income Tax on Married Couples,” 5 (Sept. 27, 1938) (on file in 
Office of Tax Analysis/Div. of Tax Research (OTA/DTR) Files, Box 54, Folder GA-5/37.3). 
 402. Roy Blakey, “Federal Income Tax, Section VII: Joint Versus Separate Returns,” in 
The Federal Revenue System: Forward and Summary of Recommendations (Sept. 20, 1934) 
(on file in Office of Tax Analysis/Div. of Tax Research (OTA/DTR) Files, Box 62), 
available at http://taxhistory.tax.org/Civilization/Documents/Surveys/hst23735/23735-
1.htm. 
 403. See, e.g., Roy Blough & Carl Shoup, “Chapter 3: Income Taxation, 3. Joint vs. 
Separate Returns,” in Roy Blough & Carl Shoup, A Report on the Federal Revenue System 
Submitted to Undersecretary of the Treasury Roswell Magill (Sept. 20, 1937) (on file in 
Office of Tax Analysis/Div. of Tax Research (OTA/DTR) Files, Box 63), available at 
http://products.tax.org/civsite/Documents/Surveys/b&s_1937/CH1.HTM. 
 404. See, e.g., id.; Roy Blough to Mr. Sullivan, Compulsory Joint Returns, 1 (June 10, 
1941) (on file in Office of Tax Analysis/Div. of Tax Research (OTA/DTR) Files, Box 54, 
Folder GA-5/41.9).  
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expenses of two-earner families.405 Further, it attempted to measure income sharing 
and power relationships within families,406 and it monitored changes in community 
property laws across the country,407 particularly once common law states began 
converting to community property for the tax savings.408 Treasury’s comprehensive 
approach accounted for economic, legal, and philosophical considerations. As 
important, it was aided by a stable of talent that included Roy Blough,409 Milton 
Friedman,410 Roswell Magill,411 Herman Oliphant,412 Randolph Paul,413 Carl 
Shoup,414 Stanley Surrey,415 William Vickrey,416 and Jacob Viner.417  
By the mid-1940s, opinion among Treasury’s experts was unanimous: use of the 
individual as the tax unit produced multiple inequities when applied to the 
family.418 Taxing the family as an entity could equalize taxes among similarly 
                                                                                                                 
 
 405. See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1942, supra note 399, at 31–32 (statement of Randolph 
Paul) (proposing working wife tax credit); Richard Slitor, Special Income Tax Allowance for 
Earnings of Wife or Head of Family (Nov. 10, 1943) (on file in Office of Tax Analysis/Div. 
of Tax Research (OTA/DTR) Files, Box 54, Folder GA-5/43.10) (same).  
 406. See TREASURY DEP’T, supra note 400, at 859 (noting data indicated spouses 
consumed family income “for the joint benefit of both spouses”); Mr. Fefferman, Issues 
Involved in the Income-Splitting Plan, 1 (Feb. 18, 1947) (on file in Office of Tax 
Analysis/Div. of Tax Research (OTA/DTR) Files, Box 54, Folder GA-5/46.7) (examining 
sharing and consumption patterns within families); Roy Blough to Mr. Hanes, supra note 
401 (concluding it was impossible to learn the “actual truth” of these relationships).  
 407. See, e.g., Anita Wells, Community Property, 12 (July 24, 1941) (on file in Office of 
Tax Analysis/Div. of Tax Research (OTA/DTR) Files, Box 54, Folder GA-5/41.23); Ellis W. 
Manning, Oklahoma Community Property Law of 1939, 4 (1940) (on file in Office of Tax 
Analysis/Div. of Tax Research (OTA/DTR) Files, Box 54, Folder GA-5/41.23); Anita Wells 
to Roy Blough (Nov. 6, 1939) (on file in Office of Tax Analysis/Div. of Tax Research 
(OTA/DTR) Files, Box 54, Folder GA-5/39.6) (discussing Oklahoma optional community 
property law).  
 408. See McMahon, supra note 24 (discussing states’ efforts to reduce federal taxes on 
their residents); infra notes 447–50 and accompanying text. 
 409. Economist, University of Chicago, Columbia University; Member, Council of 
Economic Advisors; Assistant Secretary and Director, Division of Tax Research, Treasury.  
 410. Economist, University of Chicago; Nobel Laureate. 
 411. Law professor, Columbia University; Chief Attorney, Assistant Secretary, and 
Undersecretary, Treasury. 
 412. Law professor, University of Chicago, Columbia University; General Counsel, 
Treasury. 
 413. General Counsel, Treasury; Director, New York Federal Reserve Bank; Founder, 
Paul Weiss LLP. 
 414. Economist and lawyer, University of Chicago; Led multiple tax missions on behalf 
of U.S. government after World War II; Credited with inventing concept of value-added 
taxation. 
 415. Law professor, Harvard University; Assistant Secretary and Tax Legislative 
Counsel, Treasury; Pioneered concept of tax expenditure budget.  
 416. Economist, Columbia University; Nobel Laureate. 
 417. Economist, University of Chicago; Special Advisor, Treasury; Early proponent of 
monetarism.  
 418. See, e.g., TREASURY DEP’T, supra note 400, at 849, 851–52 (stating individual tax 
unit produced “substantial tax differences between families with equal incomes”). 
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situated families, prevent income shifting among family members, and raise federal 
revenues. It also enjoyed “the basic merit of recognizing the family as a single unit 
in its financial affairs, consistently with its unity in other respects and with 
governmental policy in other fields,”419 including “relief, subsidized housing and 
minimum wage determination.”420 For “the bulk” of Americans, “the family is a 
communal organization which serves as the unit for income receipt, for spending, [] 
for measuring sacrifice,” and for determining ability to pay taxes.421  
Treasury’s thinking coincided with a growing consensus among experts, courts, and 
Congress. Current law allowed families to create “an unreal number of economic 
units”422 that achieved “multiplication of the taxpayer’s personality.”423 Families acted in 
“every other vital economic and social respect . . . on a consolidated basis,” but not under 
the tax law.424 Income shifting devices and community property, Randolph Paul said, 
obscured the unity of the family to make it appear “as if there were no such economic 
unit.”425 Family tax avoidance not only reduced revenues, but backlogged courts. “Our 
tax machinery is too heavily strained to stand this increasing load of litigation,” Stanley 
Surrey warned.426 “The law should be changed to require husbands and wives and minor 
children living together to file a composite return.”427 Treating families as a unit could 
“eliminate the greater part of questionable current avoidance, and would remove the 
unjustified tax differential between citizens of community property states and those of 
other states.”428  
The Supreme Court had already begun recognizing the family as a taxable unit. 
In Wells, the Court emphasized the “solidarity of the family,”429 while in Clifford it 
found a “temporary reallocation of income within an intimate family group.”430 In 
Hormel v. Helvering,431 the Court handed down a “startling broadening of the 
family solidarity concept” by effectively finding that trustee-wives could never act 
independently of co-trustee-husbands.432 The Court also validated the unity of the 
family with respect to loss deductions from sales of property between family 
members,433 aggregated charitable deductions,434 and different exemption levels for 
                                                                                                                 
 
 419. Miss Coyle, supra note 35; see also WILLIAM VICKREY, AGENDA FOR PROGRESSIVE 
TAXATION 74–75 (1947) (arguing families made consumption expenditures “for the joint 
benefit of all members of the family”).  
 420. Roy Blough to Mr. Sullivan, supra note 404, at 1. 
 421. Id.  
 422. Pavenstedt, supra note 368, at 216.  
 423. Paul, supra note 393, at 48. 
 424. Paul & Havens, supra note 242, at 264. 
 425. Paul, supra note 393, at 48–49. 
 426. Stanley S. Surrey, Family Income and Federal Taxation, 24 TAXES 980, 982 (1946).  
 427. Harry J. Rudick, The Problem of Personal Income Tax Avoidance, 7 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 243, 264 (1940). 
 428. Id.  
 429. Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670, 677 (1933). 
 430. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 335 (1940). 
 431. 312 U.S. 552 (1941). 
 432. Pavenstedt, supra note 368, at 220 (writing that the Court considered “one spouse 
the alter ego of the other” (emphasis in original)).  
 433. See Helvering v. Janney, 311 U.S. 189 (1940) (prohibiting such sales). 
 434. See Taft v. Helvering, 311 U.S. 195 (1940) (permitting such deductions). 
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single and married taxpayers.435 These and other decisions prompted observers to 
predict that the Court would uphold a tax statute treating the family as a unit.436 
Congress appeared willing to consider such a statute. It noted the Court’s 
receptivity to taxing the family as a unit,437 and it debated alternatives to taxing 
families on total rather than individual income.438 A number of tax statutes already 
treated the family as an economic unit, including the option to file joint returns, 
personal exemptions for married taxpayers, the disallowance of loss deductions 
from sales of property between family members, and the treatment of family 
members as one person for purposes of personal holding companies. But what 
would a generalized statute look like that treated all families as single economic 
units? Management and control plans discriminated against community property 
spouses by failing to address income-shifting arrangements among common law 
spouses, and Congress had already rejected the plan three times. Mandatory joint 
returns had fared as poorly. And although concerns over the plan’s constitutionality 
had ebbed, the prevailing wisdom was that “you can not [sic] get the votes to make 
a law out of it.”439 
Enter the split-income plan. As early as 1937, the Treasury Department 
considered remedying longstanding family tax problems by moving “in the 
direction of the community property states, not away from them.”440 The idea of 
universalizing community property for tax purposes floated around Congress in the 
early 1940s,441 and tax experts analyzed the concept.442 Extending community 
                                                                                                                 
 
 435. See Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1 (1916). 
 436. See, e.g., Roswell Magill, The Federal Income Tax on the Family, 20 TEX. L. REV. 
150, 164 (1941) (calling constitutionality of taxing the family as a unit “reasonably clear”); 
George E. Ray, Proposed Changes in Federal Taxation of Community Property: Income 
Tax, 30 CALIF. L. REV. 397, 432 (1942) (expressing “little doubt as to the constitutionality of 
a statutory provision taxing the income of a family as a unit”); Surrey, The Supreme Court, 
supra note 363, at 814 (concluding that the “Court will not place a constitutional barrier” to 
taxing the family as a unit). 
 437. See H.R. REP. NO. 77-1040, at 10, 17–22 (1941) (noting Court decisions 
“conclusively demonstrate that the convenient phrase, ‘A may not be taxed on B’s’ income, 
is by no means an all-pervasive formula which will assist in the solution of tax problems”). 
 438. See Revenue Act of 1942, supra note 399 (mandatory joint return with pro-rata 
liability); Revenue Revision of 1942: Hearing Before H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 77th 
Cong. (1942) (same); H.R. Rep. No. 77-1040, supra note 437 (same); see also S. Rep. No. 
77-673 (1941) (hybrid joint return plan with earned income taxable to the earner and 
unearned income taxable to the spouse with management and control). 
 439. Reduction of Individual Income Taxes: Hearing on H.R. 4790 Before S. Comm. on 
Fin., 80th Cong. 272 (1948) (statement of Sen. Eugene Millikin). 
 440. Blough & Shoup, supra note 403. 
 441. See Revenue Act of 1942, supra note 399, at 32–33 (statement of Sen. Robert Taft) 
(“It seems to me, if you want to eliminate [tax disparities between families] the thing to do is 
to go back to the individual basis and let the families divide their income between husband 
and wife equally, as they do in community-property States.”). 
 442. See ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL TAXATION 427 (1940) 
(querying whether it was “feasible to extend to all of the country the tax benefits of the 
community system”); George T. Altman, Community Property: Avoiding Avoidance by 
Adoption in the Revenue Act, 16 TAXES 138, 141 (1938) (arguing for taxing similarly 
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property nationwide even made its way into the public discourse.443 Common law 
states sought tax savings for their married residents without adopting community 
property laws. In 1947, ten states444 petitioned Congress for a law universalizing 
community property for purposes of filing federal income taxes, and individual 
legislators introduced twenty bills providing income-splitting privileges to spouses 
nationwide.445 Public opinion polls reflected the widespread support, with 74% of 
respondents answering “yes” to the Gallup poll question: “For the purpose of 
income taxes in nine States a man and wife can divide their income equally 
between themselves to reduce their income tax. Should married couples in the other 
39 States be allowed to do the same thing?”446  
By 1948, five states and one territory decided they could wait no longer for 
Congress to intervene.447 They took the drastic step of converting from 
longstanding common law regimes to community property law, while twelve more 
states considered similar measures.448 The Treasury urged Congress to enact a 
national plan before additional states made the awkward conversion to community 
property, a process that created “considerable confusion and dislocation of property 
interests in the various States.”449 With “so many States shifting” and with others 
prepared to do the same, Treasury official Stanley Surrey argued that it was “proper 
for the Federal Government to act” with a split income plan.450 
Other historical factors converged to move the idea of income splitting to the top 
of the policy agenda. In the immediate postwar period Congress sought tax cuts, 
both as a peace dividend and as a way to stimulate the economy. Experts, too, 
believed that tax cuts could ease the economy’s transition from wartime to 
peacetime, and provide the necessary stimulus to private investment.451 Income 
                                                                                                                 
situated families equally by “extending to all the benefits now limited to the few”). 
 443. See Jones, supra note 359, at 266–74; McMahon, supra note 24.  
 444. Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oregon, South 
Dakota, and Wisconsin. 
 445. See Anita Wells, Community Property States (Sept. 1, 1947) (on file in Office of 
Tax Analysis/Div. of Tax Research (OTA/DTR) Files, Box 54, Folder GA-5/47.15).  
 446. Individual Income Tax Reduction: Hearing on H.R. 1 Before S. Comm. on Fin., 80th 
Cong. 551 (1947) (statement of Sen. William Fulbright). 
 447. Hawaii (1945), Michigan (1947), Nebraska (1947), Oklahoma (1939), Oregon 
(1943), and Pennsylvania (1947). See McMahon, supra note 24 (discussing states’ efforts to 
reduce federal taxes on their residents).  
 448. Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Some common law 
residents sought tax savings by migrating to neighboring community property states. For the 
tax-induced exodus from common law to community property states, see 93 CONG. REC. 
5837–40 (statements of Sen. John McClellan, Sen. William Knowland, Sen. Kenneth 
Wherry, Sen. William Fulbright). 
 449. Individual Income Tax Reduction: Hearing on H.R. 1, supra note 446, at 488 
(statement of Stanley Surrey, Tax Legislative Council, Treasury Department). 
 450. Id. at 489; see also Erwin N. Griswold, Defense Emphasizes Our Need for Sound 
Tax System, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1941, at E8 (arguing forcing common law states to adopt 
community property was “highly undesirable in view of complexity of that regime”). 
 451. See, e.g., HAROLD M. GROVES, POSTWAR TAXATION AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS 
(1946); RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION FOR PROSPERITY (1947); Carl Shoup, Three Plans for 
Post-War Taxation, 34 AM. ECON. REV. 757 (1944); Clark Warburton, A Suggestion for 
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splitting accomplished the desired tax reduction without protracted and 
acrimonious debate over adjustments to tax rates and brackets.  
After sweeping to victory in the 1946 mid-term elections, Republicans wasted 
little time in passing two tax reduction bills. President Truman vetoed them both on 
the grounds that they offered “the wrong kind of tax reduction, at the wrong 
time.”452 The Republican leadership repackaged tax cuts a third time in a “veto-
proof” bill that provided something for everyone.453 It increased personal and 
dependent exemptions,454 a move that appealed to Democrats, and it lowered tax 
rates across the board,455 a move supported by Republicans. The bill also permitted 
spouses nationwide to split marital income and property for purposes of filing 
federal income taxes,456 a provision that amounted to an additional tax cut for 
married, common law taxpayers. It even included something for community 
property residents: repeal of the 1942 amendments to the federal estate and gift 
taxes that had raised transfer taxes on community property spouses.457  
Truman opposed the bill, but there was little he could do to prevent its 
enactment. The split-income plan accomplished “simplicity of taxpayer 
compliance, ease of administration, and minimum of disruptive change in the local 
laws of States.”458 It prescribed the soothing pill of “tax-reduction and tax-
equalization.”459 It did not “do violence to [the] fundamental property laws” of 
states, nor raise constitutional concerns.460 It produced tax uniformity among 
married couples, discouraged income-shifting schemes, and minimized litigation 
over tax-saving devices. It stanched the “impetuous enactment” of community 
property law, moreover.461 And it promised tax saving for all married couples,462 a 
                                                                                                                 
Post-War Taxes, 36 AM. ECON. REV. 882 (1946).  
 452. H.R. DOC. NO. 80-322, at 1 (1947).  
 453. RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 482 (1954).  
 454. H.R. 4970, 80th Cong. § 201 (1948). 
 455. Id. §§ 101, 401.  
 456. Id. § 301.  
 457. Id. § 351; see also S. REP. NO. 80-1013 (Supplementary Report) (1948). The 1942 
amendments ignored shared individual ownership interests of spouses under community 
property law, and taxed the predeceasing spouse as full owner of the marital property in 
addition to the surviving spouse on her share at death. With respect to the gift tax, the law 
treated community property spouses as a single entity such that they received one gift tax 
exemption while common law spouses received two.  
 458. Division of Tax Research Staff, Major Issues in Drafting the 50-50 Family Income 
Splitting Proposal, 2 (Oct. 2, 1947) (on file in Office of Tax Analysis/Div. of Tax Research 
(OTA/DTR) Files, Box 54, Folder GA-5/47.10). 
 459. H.R. REP. NO. 80-1274, at 3 (1948). 
 460. Reduction of Individual Income Taxes: Hearing on H.R. 4790, supra note 439, at 
305 (statement of Allan H. W. Higgins, Section of Taxation, American Bar Association). 
 461. S. REP. NO. 80-1013, at 25 (1948). 
 462. In 1948, the tax benefits associated with income splitting accrued disproportionately 
to a small cohort of wealthy taxpayers. See Reduction of Individual Income Taxes: Hearing 
on H.R. 4790, supra note 439, at 24 (statement of John Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury) 
(reporting 97.5% of income-splitting benefits went to less than 4% of taxpayers). Rising 
incomes and the declining value of tax-free thresholds in the postwar period meant that an 
increasing number of spouses would realize income-splitting benefits over the next several 
decades. 
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group that comprised 80% of all households.463 Common law spouses benefited 
from dividing marital income equally, while community property spouses benefited 
from dividing income from separate property, a source of income which was not 
co-owned under community property law. 
In the end, the income-splitting plan, along with the rest of the Revenue Act of 
1948,464 sailed through Congress, easily overcoming Truman’s third veto of tax 
legislation in less than a year.465 Tax reformers heralded income splitting as a 
victory. Basking in its enactment, Harvard law professor and former Treasury 
official Stanley Surrey observed with satisfaction that the provision “adds a 
chapter” to “the long history of the treatment of family income” that was “likely to 
be the last for many years.”466 Moreover, it reflected the principle “that 
achievement of tax equity among married couples requires an income tax based 
upon a nationwide uniform plan that disregards, as between husband and wife, the 
legal allocation of their income or the legal ownership of the property producing 
the income.”467 
With the enactment of income splitting, ownership as the lodestar of family 
taxation had been supplanted by a legal fiction. Or had it? 
CONCLUSION: SEABORN, INCOME SPLITTING, AND TAXING MODERN FAMILIES 
In 1935, tax lawyers Randolph Paul and Valentine Havens argued that treating 
husbands and wives as single tax units could solve the problems associated with 
ascertaining family tax liability under an ownership rule. “There would be no need 
to resort to ownership as a test of tax incidence if the husband and wife were a tax 
unit, or ‘unified welded entity.’”468 Paul and Havens were right that treating 
spouses under the federal income tax as a single unit rather than two distinct units 
with “legal separateness”469 would shift the focus from the individual to the family. 
But it would not eliminate ownership “as a test of tax incidence.” At best, it 
replaced an ownership rule concerned with individual interests with another 
ownership rule concerned with combined interests. Aggregating a family’s income 
and property to determine its tax liability still required examining ownership 
interests of individual family members under state property law. Specifically, it still 
required determining what income and property individual members owed such 
that it could be aggregated, split in two, and taxed as two equal halves.  
The income-splitting provision enacted in 1948 was even less of a threat to the 
ownership principle than the concept of treating families as single economic units. 
It was “simply a method of calculating the Federal income tax on a husband and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 463. KAREN ANDERSON, WARTIME WOMEN: SEX ROLES, FAMILY RELATIONS, AND THE 
STATUS OF WOMEN DURING WORLD WAR II 5 (1981). 
 464. Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, 62 Stat. 110. 
 465. H.R. DOC. NO. 80-589, at 2 (1948). 
 466. Stanley S. Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family—The Revenue Act of 1948, 61 
HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1104 (1948). 
 467. Id. at 1114. 
 468. Paul & Havens, supra note 242, at 245 (quoting Brownsville Coal & Coke Co. v. 
Heiner, 38 F.2d 248, 251 (W.D. Pa. 1930)).  
 469. Id.  
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wife who file a joint return,” Stanley Surrey told Congress in 1947.470 It was an 
administrative convenience, a device to extend postwar tax cuts and to discourage 
families from undertaking costly income-shifting behavior. As the Senate explained 
in its own description of the provision, it merely allowed husbands and wives the 
“opportunity” to “file joint returns, divide their net income and exemptions by two, 
compute their tax on this basis, and multiply the result by two.”471  
Income splitting did not challenge Seaborn’s holding that the federal income tax 
was a levy “upon the net income of every individual” and that “the word ‘of’ 
denotes ownership.”472 Nor did it alter prevailing internal revenue laws requiring 
that the federal income tax be “levied, collected, and paid for each taxable year 
upon the net income of every individual.”473 And it certainly did not stop federal 
and state courts from invoking Seaborn nearly 100 times for the “ownership equals 
taxability” principle.474 Owners of income and property within families were still 
subject to federal income taxation, and ownership was still determined by the 
interests of individual family members under applicable state law.475 
Eighty years after Seaborn and sixty years after introduction of the income-
splitting provision, the “ownership equals taxability” principle still resonates. Not 
only is Seaborn good law,476 it remains the lodestar of family taxation. It tells us 
that family tax liability under both the federal income tax and federal estate tax 
follows ownership, not marriage. In 2011 as in 1930, Seaborn requires ascertaining 
property interests as determined by state law rather than locating the presence or 
absence of a marriage license. Members of state-recognized familial relationships 
in 2011 may look different or more heterogeneous than members of state-
recognized familial relationships in 1930, but ownership of income and property 
under state property law rather than the existence of a marital contract dictates 
family tax liability.  
In 2010, the IRS acknowledged this reality by applying the “ownership equals 
taxability” principle to registered domestic partners in California, both same-sex 
and opposite-sex RDPs.477 “Applying the principle that federal law respects state 
law property characterizations,” the IRS Chief Counsel opined, “the federal tax 
treatment of community property should apply to California registered domestic 
partners.”478 Subsequently, the government extended its holding to domestic 
                                                                                                                 
 
 470. Individual Income Tax Reduction: Hearing on H.R. 1, supra note 446, at 490 
(statement of Stanley Surrey, Tax Legislative Council, Treasury Department). 
 471. S. REP. NO. 80-1013, at 4 (1948).  
 472. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 109 (1930). 
 473. 26 U.S.C. § 11 (1946). Current law reflects the same focus on individual ownership, 
even for married taxpayers. See 26 U.S.C. § 1(a)–(d) (2006) (the federal income tax reaches 
the “taxable income” of “every married individual . . . who makes a single return jointly with 
his spouse”; of “every head of a household”; of “every individual . . . who is not a married 
individual”; and of “every married individual” who does not file jointly).  
 474. Cases on file with author. 
 475. See also McMahon, supra note 24.  
 476. See supra note 3 (recent cases citing Seaborn favorably). 
 477. California permits opposite-sex couples to register as domestic partners so long as 
one or both persons are over the age of 62. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(b)(5)(B) (2010). 
 478. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. 201021050, supra note 11, at 2.  
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partners in Nevada and Washington, both of which grant full community property 
rights to RDPs.479 Thus, even though the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) 
prohibits these couples from filing federal income taxes as spouses480 (the filing 
status with the most favorable rates), they can now take advantage of tax savings 
associated with income splitting. For example, as a result of the 2010 ruling, a 
domestic partnership in California with one partner earning $100,000 and the other 
earning $30,000 would now report two incomes of $65,000 when filing federal 
income taxes, resulting in tax savings of $942.481  
There is much to praise in the 2010 guidance, not least of which is the explicit 
application of the “ownership equals taxability” principle to nontraditional families. 
But the ruling leaves much to be desired.  
First, it has no precedential value. Neither the Chief Counsel Advisory482 nor the 
private letter ruling483 on which it was based may be used or cited as precedent.484 
The letter ruling applies exclusively to the specific taxpayer who requested the 
ruling and solely to the questions posed in the original request. Similarly, the CCA 
only analyzes the unique facts and circumstances posed in the ruling request 
without covering relevant questions pertaining to the application of federal taxation 
to state law.  
In its 2010 Annual Report to Congress, the IRS National Taxpayer Advocate 
highlighted some of these unresolved issues, identifying them among the “Most 
Serious Problems” facing taxpayers.485 Federal tax law contains provisions 
                                                                                                                 
 
 479. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.  
 480. See supra note 25.  
 481. Calculated from tables for 2010 tax year. See Rev. Proc. 2011-12, 2011-2 I.R.B. 1. 
Without income splitting, the couple would pay $25,692 in federal income tax compared to 
$24,750. Tax savings for domestic partners in the three affected states will vary based on the 
income ratio between partners. Generally, greater savings will accrue to partners with more 
unequal ratios, because shifting higher percentages of total income moves the family further 
down the rate scale (in other words, the tax on one $100,000 income will be lower than the 
tax on two $50,000 incomes). 
 482. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. 201021050, supra note 11. 
 483. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201021048 (May 5, 2010).  
 484. 26 U.S.C. § 6110(k)(3) (2006). 
 485. 1 NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2010 ANNUAL 
REPORT TO CONGRESS 211–20 (2010). For news coverage of these issues and the confusion 
they create for same-sex couples, including the approximately 60,000 legally partnered 
same-sex couples in California (comprising approximately 18,000 same-sex marriages and 
58,000 RDPs, two overlapping categories), see Scott James, For Same-Sex Couples, a Tax 
Victory That Doesn’t Feel Like One, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2011, at A21; see also Strauss v. 
Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009) (preserving the 18,000 same-sex marriages performed in 
California between June and November 2008); Laura Meckler, Gay Couples Get Equal Tax 
Treatment, WALL ST. J. ONLINE (June 5, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052748704080104575286931017169308.html (58,000 California RDPs). A 
significant percentage of these couples are legally recognized as both RDPs and spouses 
under state law; that is, they are registered as domestic partners with the California Secretary 
of State, and they also obtained valid marriages between June 16, 2008 and November 5, 
2008 before Proposition 8 denied that right under the state constitution. See CAL. CONST. art. 
1, § 7.5, invalidated by Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F.Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), stay 
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pertaining to childcare, health care, education, and welfare that require taxpayers to 
meet certain qualifying definitions. Defining “child” under the federal income tax, 
for instance, determines eligibility for head of household filing status486 and the 
dependency deduction,487 in addition to the child-care credit,488 child tax credit,489 
and earned income tax credit.490 But it is unclear which partner in a domestic 
partnership or civil union or same-sex marriage may be entitled to claim these tax 
benefits on her tax return, particularly if the qualifying child was the stepchild of 
one partner by virtue of the domestic partnership or civil union or marriage. Federal 
tax law does not define “child” in relation to marriage, and DOMA provides no 
definition. But if DOMA disregards the legal existence of these families, it is 
unclear which of the two partners—both of whom are considered the child’s parent 
under state law—can qualify the child for federal tax purposes.491 Such 
characterization is significant for allocating these child-related subsidies in the 
most tax advantageous way, all of which require positive taxable income as a 
condition of receipt and some of which phase out at higher income levels. 
A similar problem occurs when trying to qualify eligible “dependents” under the 
tax law’s education provisions. These include tax dispensations for a dependent’s 
college tuition and student loan interest as well as the Lifetime Learning Credit, 
Hope Scholarship Credit, American Opportunity Tax Credit, and other deductions 
and exclusions related to education.492 As the National Taxpayer Advocate asked in 
its 2010 annual report, “Is a domestic partner or same gender spouse in a 
community property state deemed to provide, for dependency purposes, the support 
that he or she earns?”493 More specifically, “will dependency status be determined 
on the basis of individual earnings or only after allocating all community income 
equally between the partners?”494 The same questions arise for tax provisions 
related to medical care expenses of dependents.495  
                                                                                                                 
granted, No. 10-16696, 2010 WL 3212786 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2010).  
 486. 26 U.S.C. § 2(b) (2006). 
 487. See id. §§ 151–52 (2006 & Supp. II 2009). 
 488. See id. § 21. 
 489. See id. § 24. 
 490. See id. § 32. 
 491. For discussion of DOMA’s impact on the federal tax treatment of same-sex couples, 
see Patricia A. Cain, DOMA and the Internal Revenue Code, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 481 
(2009); Anthony C. Infanti, Taxing Civil Rights Gains, 16 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 319 (2010); 
William P. Kratzke, The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) Is Bad Income Tax Policy, 35 U. 
MEM. L. REV. 399 (2005).  
 492. See 26 U.S.C. § 222 (Qualified tuition and related expenses); id. § 135 (Income 
from U.S. savings bonds used to pay higher education tuition and fees); id. § 221 (Interest on 
education loans); id. § 25A (Hope and Lifetime Learning credits).  
 493. 1 NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 485, at 215.  
 494. Patricia Cain, National Taxpayer Advocate Reports That Tax Law Creates Serious 
Problem for Same-Sex Couples, SAME SEX TAX LAW BLOG (Jan. 15, 2011, 4:03 PM), 
http://law.scu.edu/blog/samesextax/national-taxpayer-advocate-reports-that-tax-law-creates-
serious-problem-for-same-sex-couples.cfm. 
 495. These provisions include, among others, the exclusion for certain employer 
reimbursements, 26 U.S.C. § 105, the deduction for extraordinary medical and dental 
expenses, id. § 213, Flexible Spending Accounts, id. § 125, Archer Medical Savings 
Accounts, id. § 220, and Health Savings Accounts, id. § 223. Additional issues discussed in 
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Congress enacted all of these provisions—whether related to childcare, health 
care, education, or general welfare—to help families with children. Yet it is 
unclear, particularly in light of DOMA, whether members of same-sex marriages, 
domestic partners, civil unions and all related children enjoy access to the same 
economic and educational support enjoyed by all other taxpayers. In the meantime, 
hundreds of thousands of same-sex couples take positions on their tax returns every 
year in an environment of significant legal uncertainty.496 
Besides lacking precedential value and failing to answer myriad questions, the 
2010 ruling applies exclusively to domestic partners in three community property 
states. It mandates that RDPs in California, Nevada, and Washington “must report 
one-half of the community income . . . on his or her federal income tax return.”497 
But what about the hundreds of thousands of other same-sex couples in legally 
recognized relationships throughout the country, particularly those living in states 
that extend property rights to these nontraditional families? 
This Article lays the foundation for a broader application of the “ownership 
equals taxability” principle. Its contents demonstrate that same-sex couples in legal 
relationships recognized under the law of any community property state are entitled 
to the same federal income tax treatment as afforded RDPs in California, Nevada, 
and Washington. This includes Wisconsin, which already has a relatively robust 
domestic partnership law (though it currently does not extend application of marital 
property law to domestic partners),498 New Mexico, which appears to be on the 
brink of enacting domestic partnership legislation,499 and any of the remaining four 
community property states (Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana, Texas) that in the future 
may recognize same-sex couples and subject them to the state’s community 
property regime. It would also include same-sex spouses in California, whether 
married before or after Proposition 8 and whether their marriage licenses were 
                                                                                                                 
the National Taxpayer Advocate’s report include the treatment of alimony and property 
settlements upon divorce, whether the creation of community property should be treated as a 
taxable transfer for same-sex couples, and whether same-sex tenants by the entirety have a 
qualified joint interest for estate tax purposes. See 1 NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra 
note 485, at 215–17. 
 496. Given this legal uncertainty, which was heightened by the government’s 2010 ruling 
pertaining to RDPs in California, the American Bar Association Section of Taxation 
authorized its Teaching Tax Committee to examine community property issues related to 
RDPs. Upon completion of its study, the ABA Community Property Comment Project will 
submit comments to the IRS. See Nicole Duarte, ABA Forms Group to Examine Domestic 
Partner Community Property Questions, 127 TAX NOTES 1435 (2010). In the interest of full 
disclosure, I serve as a member of this task force. 
 497. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. 201021050, supra note 11, at 2. 
 498. See WIS. STAT. §§ 770.001–.018 (West 2010) (providing various legal protections in 
areas including insurance, decisions about medical treatment and health care, retirement, 
death benefits and probate, but not encompassing some aspects of marriage, including, 
among other things, marital property law). 
 499. Although domestic partnership legislation failed to pass the New Mexico legislature 
in both 2010 and 2009, it enjoys the strong support of Gov. Bill Richardson. Its key sponsor, 
Sen. Peter Wirth (D-Santa Fe), has predicted, “It’s gonna happen, it’s just a matter of when.” 
Larry Behrens, Domestic Partnerships Done for 2010, But Will Be Back, Supporters Say, 
N.M INDEP. (Feb. 15, 2010, 7:52 P.M.), http://newmexicoindependent.com/47693/domestic-
partnerships-done-for-2010-but-will-be-back-supporters-say. 
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issued by California or other jurisdictions. Same-sex couples with California 
marriage licenses (only issued between June 16, 2008 and November 5, 2008) 
remain subject to the state’s community property regime, because the California 
Supreme Court held that all same-sex couples married in California before the 
effective date of Proposition 8 are still legally married.500 Moreover, by virtue of 
SB 54, signed into law by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger in late 2009, same-sex 
couples with marriage licenses issued outside California either before or after 
Proposition 8 are entitled to full recognition as married couples and fully subject to 
the state’s community property statute.501  
In addition to providing the basis for extending “ownership equals taxability” to 
same-sex couples in all community property states (not just California, Nevada, and 
Washington), this Article foreshadows an even more expansive application of the 
principle to common law states. Currently, a number of common law states 
recognize familial relationships other than traditional spouses, including same-sex 
marriages,502 civil unions,503 domestic partnerships,504 and reciprocal beneficiary 
relationships.505 In addition to the six jurisdictions that authorize same-sex 
marriage, New Jersey (civil union), Oregon (domestic partnership), and the District 
of Columbia (domestic partnership) confer comprehensive legal status on same-sex 
couples substantially similar to marriage. The other jurisdictions recognizing same-
sex relationships transfer less comprehensive legal status with more limited rights. 
Regardless of specific allocation of rights, to the extent these common law 
jurisdictions determine ownership of income and property for same-sex couples by 
virtue of general property law, Seaborn’s “ownership equals taxability” principle 
                                                                                                                 
 
 500. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009) (preserving the 18,000 same-sex 
marriages performed in California). 
 501. See Nat’l Ctr. for Lesbian Rights & Equal. Cal., SB 54 and Same-Sex Couples Who 
Marry Outside California (Oct. 20, 2009), available at www.nclrights.org/site/ 
DocServer/SB_54_FAQ.pdf?docID=6641. In the United States, jurisdictions granting 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples include Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, Vermont and the District of Columbia. International jurisdictions include 
Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Iceland, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, and 
The Netherlands. See Dan Fastenberg, International Gay Marriage, TIME (July 22, 2010), 
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,2005678,00.html. 
 502. Common law states recognizing same-sex marriages include Connecticut, Iowa, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, and the District of Columbia. Three additional 
states (Maryland, New York, Rhode Island) recognize same-sex marriages from these six 
jurisdictions.  
 503. New Jersey is the only state that currently recognizes civil unions, while Illinois will 
begin authorizing civil unions in June 2011. See Ray Long & Monique Garcia, Illinois 
Senate OKs Civil Unions, Historic Legislation Goes to Quinn, Who Supports It, CHI. TRIB. 
(Dec. 1, 2010), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-12-01/news/ct-met-civil-unions-
senate-20101201_1_civil-unions-gay-child-vote. In Connecticut, New Hampshire, and 
Vermont, civil unions were replaced by same-sex marriage.  
 504. Common law jurisdictions recognizing domestic partnerships include Colorado, 
Maine, Maryland, Oregon, and the District of Columbia.  
 505. Hawaii is the only state that recognizes reciprocal beneficiary relationships, which 
under current law extends limited rights to beneficiaries.  
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should apply.506 It is true that most common law jurisdictions currently follow a 
strict title theory of ownership during the lifetime of the marriage (emphasizing 
separate rather than shared interests), such that Seaborn cannot accomplish income 
splitting as readily as it does in community property states. But for those common 
law states that apply less rigid title theories of ownership under their marital 
property law, or whose property law reflects some aspects of community property 
principles, Seaborn’s “ownership equals taxability” rule could accomplish at least 
some degree of income splitting for same-sex couples.507  
While Seaborn may have only partial application in common law jurisdictions, 
it can achieve uniform and comprehensive reform in all nine community property 
states, not just in California, Nevada, and Washington. To the extent the remaining 
six community property states desire extending comprehensive legal status to 
same-sex couples at some point in the future (while also securing valuable income-
splitting privileges on par with same-sex residents in California, Nevada, and 
Washington), I offer three suggestions, two based on this Article’s findings and a 
third based on current political and economic realities. 
First, the chosen policy (whether marriage, civil union, or domestic partnership) 
should automatically rather than voluntarily subject same-sex couples to a state’s 
community property regime. In Commissioner v. Harmon,508 the U.S. Supreme 
Court invalidated Oklahoma’s elective community property law, which, “even 
though authorized by state law and irrevocable in character,” did not transfer 
necessary ownership interests for purposes of allowing couples to split their income 
under the federal income tax.509 The optional Oklahoma statute looked and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 506. As this Article has demonstrated, federal courts view domestic relations law as the 
province of the states. As recently as 2004, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its deference, 
stating,  
One of the principal areas in which this Court has customarily declined to 
intervene is the realm of domestic relations. Long ago we observed that ‘[t]he 
whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, 
belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States.’  
Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (quoting In re Burrus, 136 
U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890)); see also Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 587 (1989) 
(“[D]omestic relations are preeminently matters of state law.”); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 
415, 435 (1979) (“Family relations are a traditional area of state concern.”). Also as this 
Article has shown, federal courts respect income splitting between members of state-
recognized families by operation of general property law, but not by private contract. And, 
as Seaborn itself held, ownership of income and property determines tax liability, and state 
property law determines ownership of family income and property.  
 507. Examining this claim in a comprehensive and meaningful way requires an entirely 
separate article.  
 508. 323 U.S. 44, 46 (1944) (invalidating Oklahoma’s optional community property law 
as creating a “consensual” rather than a “legal” community). 
 509. Id. According to the leading scholar on the subject, “the allure of the community 
property regime [in Oklahoma] had been intimately linked to its tax savings,” a fact not 
overlooked by the Court as it sought to determine whether the Oklahoma statute sufficiently 
altered incidents of ownership or inappropriately authorized tax savings for state residents. 
McMahon, supra note 24, at 622. For a wonderful discussion of Oklahoma’s optional 
community property law and the Harmon decision, see id. at 592–611. 
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operated more like a private law contract than a general law property statute, the 
latter of which vested by operation of law rather than by discretion of the parties. 
By comparison, RDPs in California (and Nevada and Washington) “are 
mandatorily subject to the community property regime. For them, community 
property is part of a single system and not an option they can elect or reject while 
retaining the rest of the rights and obligations of the system.”510 Consequently, the 
community property regime in these states can be said to transfer sufficient 
ownership interests, allowing domestic partners to split their combined income. 
Second, the chosen policy should provide immediate, vested, and equal rights in 
all income and property to same-sex couples in the same way it does to opposite-
sex spouses. For the “ownership equals taxability” rule to attach, state law must 
require that income is shared the moment it arises (and not shared, for instance, by 
virtue of an assignment or gift or contract), at which point Seaborn authorizes 
income splitting for federal income tax purposes.  
Finally, while “state domestic relations law has outpaced federal tax law,”511 
there remains solid opposition to extending equal rights to same-sex couples, even 
in states that currently recognize same-sex relationships.512 Advocates for state-
recognized, same-sex relationships must seize every political and economic 
advantage, including exploiting the findings of studies that indicate extending legal 
rights to same-sex couples can generate significant revenue for states. According to 
researchers, allowing same-sex marriage in New Jersey, for instance, could boost 
the economy by $200 million per year, create 1,400 jobs, and net $15.1 million in 
tax revenues for the state and for local governments.513 Another study found that 
since 2005, the economic benefit to Massachusetts from allowing same-sex 
marriage topped $100 million.514 Indeed, the positive economic impact of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 510. Cain, Taxing Families Fairly, supra note 21, at 846.  
 511. 1 NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 485, at 211. 
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studies pertaining to the economic impact of extending legal status to same-sex couples in 
other states, see NAOMI G. GOLDBERG, R. BRADLEY SEARS & M.V. LEE BADGETT, WILLIAMS 
INST., POTENTIAL IMPACT OF HB444 ON STATE OF HAWAII (2009) (citing as much as $9.5 
million over four years from civil union celebrations, $40.3 million in out-of-state guest 
travel to civil union celebrations, $1.6 million in higher excise tax revenues $77,000 in filing 
fees, $400,000 savings in public benefits programs, and 333 new jobs); CHRISTOPHER 
RAMOS, M.V. LEE BADGETT & BRAD SEARS, WILLIAMS INST., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF 
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CHRISTOPHER RAMOS, M.V. LEE BADGETT, MICHAEL D. STEINBERGER & BRAD SEARS, 
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extending legal rights to same-sex couples could ease the severe fiscal crisis facing 
every state.515 Researchers have also shown that recognizing same-sex relationships 
nationwide as part of federal policy could have similarly positive economic effects 
on the national budget, netting as much as $1 billion a year.516 
If policy makers and reformers followed these three rules, particularly the first 
two, they would help millions of non-traditional families, same-sex as well as 
opposite-sex. Extending equal “rights, protections, and benefits” to non-traditional 
families under state property law, and subjecting them to the same “responsibilities, 
obligations, and duties . . . as are granted to and imposed upon spouses” would put 
these families squarely within the four corners of Seaborn, authorizing them to split 
combined income in half when filing federal income taxes.517 In so doing, Seaborn 
offers these legally recognized couples an opportunity to circumvent the tax filing 
restrictions and disadvantages created by DOMA. Indeed, Seaborn’s “ownership 
equals taxability” rule remains the guidepost of family taxation, which for more 
than eighty years has followed ownership not marriage. 
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